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MUCH TO DO ABOUT SOMETHING: 
DESTABILIZING LAW'S SUPPORT OF 
DOMINANT IDEOLOGIES 
IN THE CONTEXT OF LESBIAN MOTHER 
CUSTODY CLAIMS IN CANADA 
NATASHA KIM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The last five years have been witness to numerous legal 
"successes" in the sphere of equality rights for lesbian and gay persons. 
Individuals and groups have fought with the legislatures and in the 
courts, often persuading judicial decision-makers that lesbian and gay 
individuals and their relationships are if the same worth as heterosexual 
persons and their relationships. The importance of this recognition 
cannot be overstated. It is now no longer legally acceptable to 
discriminate against, and in some cases, to deny benefits to, an 
individual on the basis of her or his sexual orientation. 
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada heard Brian Mossop's claim 
for recognition of his partner as a "spouse" under the collective 
agreement at his place of work. While rejecting the argument that non-
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recognition was discrimination under the ground of "family status", the 
majority of the Court expressly opened the door to claims based on 
sexual orientation. 1 This occurred in 1995, when James Egan convinced 
the bench that sexual orientation was an analogous ground under the 
section 15 equality rights of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.2 Later, in 1998, an overwhelming majority of the bench 
agreed with Delwin Vriend that the exclusion of sexual orientation as a 
protected ground of discrimination from the Alberta human rights code3 
constituted a violation of section 15 and was not saved as a reasonable 
limit under section 1 of the Charter.4 Most recently, in 1999, the Court 
found that the Ontario Family Law Act definition of "spouse" 
unconstitutionally excluded the claims of same-sex partners for spousal 
support.5 
However, while these decisions are undeniably valuable and 
progressive landmarks in Canadian equality rights jurisprudence, using 
them as a starting point for this analysis is problematic for several 
reasons. First, the development of "sexual orientation" as a legal 
concept has occurred predominantly through the arguments and 
experiences of gay men, rather than lesbian women.6 Secondly, there is 
the problem of perception. The widely publicized decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada tends to create the illusion that sexual 
orientation discrimination did not exist before being heard by the 
Canada's highest court. The air of finality also implies that the issue has 
now been "dealt with" and is no longer a problem which requires 
attention. Thirdly, the recent protections under the Charter and human 
rights legislation fail to cover the gaps and cracks in the legal system 
where the influence of heterosexist assumptions can still have a 
detrimental impact on peoples' lives. Lastly, arguments for "equal 
1 Mossop v. Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 [hereinafter Mossop]. 
2 Ega11 v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [hereinafter Ega11]. However the court rejected 
Egan's claim for pension benefits for his spouse John Nesbitt under the Old Age Secudty Act. 
3 flldiJJidual's Rights Frotect1011 Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. I-2. 
4 //rimdv. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [hereinafter Vrie11dj. 
5 M v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
6 See e.g. lvfossop, Egan, //rieml, supra notes 1-3. See also Laylandv. Ontano (!Vftilister of 
Consumer and Commercial Re!altons), [1993] O.J. No. 575 (Ont. C.J., Gen. Div.), where it 
was found that the refusal to grant a marriage licence to two gay men was discriminatory under 
section 15. A£. v. H. is the first case to be dealt with by the Supreme Court that specifically 
involved lesbian litigants, and this case was not decided until earlier this year. 
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rights" or the "same" treatment in law, often fail to adequately challenge 
the dominant conceptions or idea(l)s underlying law. 7 
For these reasons, I have chosen to survey a very specific legal 
context: the claims of mothers, who are lesbians, in custody disputes 
over their children, with their heterosexual ex-spouses,8 in Canadian 
courts. I will examine the developments in judgments surrounding 
custody involving a lesbian mother over the past two and a half decades, 
focusing on the line of reasoning within the judgments rather than the 
substantive results (that is, to whom custody is granted).9 The end result 
will be an attempt to better understand the interaction between law as a 
discourse and the dominant ideologies of familialism, motherhood, and 
heterono1mati vity. 
In Part Two, I will set the "legal stage" by outlining the specificities 
of custody law, which remain relatively insulated from other aspects of 
legal equality discourse. Next, I will problematize the underlying 
assumptions of the dominant ideologies of familialism, motherhood, 
and heteronormativity, and the support they receive in law. For this 
section, I will draw mainly from feminist work to deconstruct the 
institutions of family and motherhood and their effect on the oppression 
of women in society. I will also show how these ideologies interact with 
each other, and in tandem with the ideology of heteronormativity, to 
oppress the experiences of lesbians in law - in particular, lesbian 
mothers. In Part Three, I will take specific examples of lesbian mothers' 
custody claims, outlining the dominant approaches judges have taken in 
7 See D. Herman, Rights qf Passage: Struggles .for Lesbia11 and Gay Legal Equality 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) at 54-76, outlining the positive and negative 
implications of using rights discourse in legal struggles for equality. 
8 This is not to imply that lesbian women have not been involved in "familial" relationships 
where they have arranged to have children through the aid of reproductive technologies or 
other means. To make this assumption would once again result in the erroneous belief that, 
unless the law has dealt with a certain situation, it does not exist. For a discussion see D. 
Herman & C. Stychin, eds., Legal lnversio11s: Lesbians, Gay Me11, a11d the Politics o.f Law 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995); K. Arnup, "Living in the Margins: Lesbian 
Families & the Law" in K. Arnup, ed., Lesbian Pare11t1i1g: LiJJtitg With Pride a11d Prejudice 
(Charlottetown: gynergy, 1995) at 386-94. See e.g. i11ft'a note 111. 
9 I have chosen this focus in part due to deference to the unique position of the judge as 
being aware of many circumstances which may not be included in the final judgment, and in 
part because of my deference to the litigating pmiy. As neither a lesbian nor a mother, I am 
hesitant to raise normative claims regarding their circumstances or experiences; appropriation 
of (an)other's experience and oppression is a serious deviance from substantive equality 
progress. 
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certain historical periods, and I will show how these approaches support 
the perpetuation of dominant ideologies and the consequent 
marginalization of lesbian mothers. Lastly, in Part Four, I will draw 
some preliminary conclusions and propose a principled legal approach 
which may assist in avoiding the mistakes of the past. Before embarking 
on this journey however, it is first necessary to conduct a brief review of 
the legal landscape in which we will be travelling. 
II. THE STATE OF (THE) PLAY 
1. The Stage 
It is difficult to find an area other than custody law where as much 
discretion and power is invested in the trial judge. The dynamic of 
custody proceedings are often quite infonnal and the adherence to mles 
of evidence and procedure are not overly strict. 10 While the history of 
divorce and custody law is a long one, I I it will be sufficient for our 
purposes to look at the current legislation and its predecessor. 
Before the 1986 Divorce Act, the legislation in place was blatantly 
discriminatory against a homosexual spouse. As part of the fault-based 
rationale in place at the time, the statute read in paii: 
3. Subject to section 5, a petition for divorce may be presented to a 
court by a husband or wife, on the ground that the respondent, since 
the celebration of the marriage 
(a) has committed adultery; 
(b) has been guilty of sodomy, bestiality or rape, or has 
engaged in a homosexual act; 
10 This is not formalized in the sense that different rules of evidence apply, but rather, in 
practice, due to the nature of the issues and the prospective nature of the order, little is 
excluded as "irrelevant". While important to ensure the judge has all the information before 
her or him, this can also open the door to a great deal of subjectivity and discretion. Further, 
many procedures have been implemented under, for example, Nova Scotia Civil Procedure 
Rule 70, to encourage alternative methods of dispute resolution in the family law context, 
however, the relationship between the parties is likely to be quite "adversarial" by the time 
trial is reached, especially in situations where a heterosexual ex-husband is claiming 
custody for children after he has discovered his wife's sexual orientation. See e.g., Bezaire 
v. Bezaire, inft·a. 
11 See the historical review written by L'Heureux-Dube in Youngv. Young, [1993] 4 
S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Young]. See also C. Smart, The Ties that Bti1d: Law, marriage and the 
reproduction ()/palriarcha! relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). 
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( c) has gone through a form of marriage with another person; or 
( d) has treated the petitioner with physical or mental crnelty of 
such a kind as to render intolerable the continued 
cohabitation of the spouses. 
11. Upon granting a decree nisi of divorce, the comi may, if it thinks it 
fit and just to do so haJJing regard lo the co11ducl of the parties and 
the co!7dition, means and other cti-cumsla11ces (}f each of them, 
make one or more of the following orders, namely: 
(c) an order providing for the custody, care and upbringing of 
the children of the marriage. 12 
While an improvement over strict gender-based, natural-rights 
approaches of the past, 13 it is possible to see how the "fault" of one 
parent for "engag[ing] in a homosexual act" could influence the broad 
discretion of the court in custody detenninations. 14 
Although the focus in section 11 is exclusively on the parents and 
their "conduct", "condition" and "circumstances", through judicial 
interpretation, the "best interests of the child" approach became the 
main focus of most custody determinations in the 1970s.15 Thus, while 
important to note the statutory language at this time to infer the greater 
context and atmosphere of custody proceedings, the legal test has 
remained relatively constant during the periods surveyed in Part III. 16 
12 Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, s. 3 [emphasis added]. 
13 See Young, supra note 11, at 34: 
"At common law ... [f]athers were regarded as possessing a natural right to 
their children, which flowed from the belief that they knew best about the 
interests of their children and that those interests were best served by 
upholding their proprietary rights"; 
and at 36: 
"the tender years doctrine, which was described by an Ontario court in 
1933 as the common sense proposition that, in general, children under the 
age of seven needed the care of their mothers (Re 017', [1933] O.R. 212 
(C.A.)). A related presumption favoured the placement of older children 
with the parent of the same sex." 
14 An argument could be made that judges were legally mandated to take into account a 
previous homosexual act of a parent in determining custody, but this is not necessarily so. 
Even under the discriminatory legislation, a homosexual act as a ground for divorce between 
the parties, as opposed to a negative influence in determining custody of a child, could remain 
a distinct and separate concept. 
15 Tolsliyv. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 292. 
16 hr/ht at 20-44. These periods include: 1974-84, 1985-94, and 1995-99. 
78-DALHOUSIEJOURNALOFLEGALSTUDIES 
The 1986 Federal Divorce Act17 entrenched and nationalized the 
"best interests of the child" test for custody proceedings, using an 
explicit child-based approach rather than a parental-rights or parental-
fault approach. However, the broad discretion and power of the trial 
judge to determine "right" and "wrong" remains. Section 16 gives any 
court of "competent jurisdiction" - a superior court of the province the 
power to make any custody order which is in the "best interests of the 
child": 
16. ( 1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either 
or both spouses or by any other person, make an order respecting 
the custody of or the access to, or the custody of and access to, any 
or all children of the marriage 
(8) In making an order under this section, the court shall take ti1to 
co11sideratio11 only the best illterests oj"the child of the marriage as 
determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and other 
circumstances of the child. 18 
The statute also explicitly rejects the fault-based rule of its 
predecessor. 19 
17 R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 3, s. 16(8), assented to 13 February 1986, S.C. 1986, c.4. 
18 The Family Law statutes of the provinces contain similar vague directions to Family 
Court judges. For example, in Nova Scotia, for an order of custody not made during divorce 
proceedings in the Supreme Comi by a superior court judge, the court is directed to consider 
the "welfare of the child" as the paramount consideration. See Family 1Wmi1tenance Act, 
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 160 s. 18(5). 
19 Divorce Act, 1985 (2n" Supp.), c. 3, s. 16(9) reads: 
(9) In making an order under this section, the court shall not take into 
consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant 
to the ability of that person to act as a parent of a child. 
The statute also includes another principle to guide the court, known as the "Friendly 
Parent Rule" which reads at s. 16(10): 
(10) In making an order under this section, the court shall give effect to the 
principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with 
each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child and, for that 
purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness of the person for 
whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact. 
This rule has often been criticized by feminist commentators as causing particular strain in 
the lives of women, especially those who were victims of domestic violence at the hands of the 
former husband. See Nova Scotia Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Brie:( to the 
Special Joint Committee on Custody and Access, May 1998, online: <http://www.gov.ns.ca/ 
staw/Custodyb.htm> (date accessed: 29 November 1999). 
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The Supreme Court has recognized that "[ c ]ustody and access 
decisions are pre-eminently exercises in discretion,"20 however, the 
legal system has consistently upheld this test as the best way to respond 
to a myriad of factual situations and to retain flexibility. Thus, judicial 
clarification has not added much guidance. In Young v. Young, the 
Supreme Court of Canada, while upholding the constitutionality of the 
"best interests of the child" test, made the following comments 
regarding appropriate factors to be considered in making custody orders: 
In making a detennination as to the best interests of the child, cornis 
must attempt to balance such considerations as the age, physical and 
emotional constitution and psychology of both the child and his or her 
parents and the particular milieu in which the child will live. 21 
Unfortunately, this test still remains quite broadly worded and 
subject to numerous interpretations depending on the facts of each case. 
While an individualized approach and flexibility is certainly a positive 
aspect when dealing with delicate issues surrounding custody, the tint of 
the judicial lens in weighing these factors is a cause for great concern. 
The Nova Scotia Advisory Council on the Status of Women highlights 
some of the drawbacks with the indeterminacy of the test for historically 
under-represented (and unheard) groups: 
[T]he vagueness of the 'best interests' concept leaves it so open to 
interpretation that it can lend itself to becoming misunderstood, or 
subject to the latest fashion in social science research, or worse, 
hostage to the ideas of specific socially active groups ... [I]f it is built 
on white middle class norms and values "the best interests of the child" 
criterion can sometimes be used to discriminate against poor people, 
racially visible persons, or ethnocultural minorities .... We must take 
care, therefore, that we do not undermine respect for diversity by 
introducing more systemic bias into the system.22 
Certainly, it could be added to the above critique that the test is built on 
"white middle class" and heterosexual norms and values, through which 
the heterosexist biases of some judges may shine through when dealing 
with claims for custody by lesbian mothers or gay fathers. How this 
unwritten norm influences the law will be explored in the next section. 
20 Young, supra note 11 at 67. 
21 Young, supra note 11 at 66. 
22 NSACSW, supra note 19. 
80-DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
2. The Theoretical Bac!kd:rop 
In this section I will examine three predominant ideologies of 
contemporary society: familialism, motherhood, and heteronormativity. 
It is difficult to adequately separate these ideologies from each other as 
they are mutually reinforcing concepts in perpetuating the inequality of 
lesbian mothers.23 However, it is the very interrelated nature of these 
"interlocking systems of domination"24 on which I want to focus. For 
this reason, although I draw upon the work of feminist and lesbian 
academics, I would prefer to move away from strict, group-centred 
theories which attempt to reduce inequality to one simple 
characteristic.25 Systems of oppression based on characteristics such as 
sex, race, class, sexual orientation, disability and other traditionally 
recognized grounds of marginalization26 interact on numerous levels, 
23 Some explanations may be needed at this point. Firstly, the term "ideology" is used 
because of S.A.M. Gavigan's definition of the term as 
'"a reading, rather than a direct translation, of the political meaning of 
"experience.'" The analysis of' experience' through the use of the concept 
of 'ideology' may illuminate the significant dissonance between many 
(but not all) people's lived experience and the domit1cml ideology of the 
family." 
She also highlights the role of the "'ruling ideology [in that it] does not so much combat 
alternative ideas as thrust them beyond the very bounds of the thinkable."' 
For this reason, I believe ideology is more suitable in describing these pervasive and 
dominant discourses than a term such as "institution" or "construct", although they may be 
those as well. S.A.M. Gavigan, "Paradise Lost, Paradox Revisited: The Implications of 
Familial Ideology for Feminist, Lesbian, and Gay engagement to Law"( 1993) 31 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 589 at 604, 589, quoting T. Eagleton, /deolog)l: All /11trod11ct1011 (London: Verso, 
1991) at 58 [herinafter "Paradox"]. 
Secondly, I would also like to note that when describing non-heterosexual women who are 
mothers, it is often linguistically inadequate to refer to them as simply "mothers", but the 
qualifier of "lesbian" is also required for the reader to make a distinction from the heterosexual 
mother. This in and of itself is some evidence of the heterosexualized nature of the ideology of 
motherhood the interlocking systems of heteronormativity and motherhood. 
24 S. Razack, Looking 117/tite People lit the Eye: race, and culture in courtrooms and 
classrooms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 12. 
25 The prime examples of this would be Catharine MacKinnon in her feminist analysis of 
sex. Similarly, Ruthann Robson's "Lesbian Jurisprudence" has received critiques of 
essentialism in the consequential construction of the "natural lesbian" by the narrow focus on 
one characteristic sexual orientation. See D. Herman, "A Jurisprudence of One's Own? 
Ruthann Robson's Lesbian Legal The01y" ( 1994) Can. J. Women & the Law 509. 
26 It is conceivable that each of these characteristics could be further divided into even more 
specific characteristics. For example, race can include issues of visible as opposed to non-
visible minorities, or distinctions between different visible minorities and cultures; disability 
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and it is this interaction which I plan to explore on the ideological levels 
of the family, motherhood and compulsory heterosexuality.27 In each 
section I will further attempt to highlight the extent to which these 
ideologies have influenced each other and the law in custody 
determinations. 28 
z: Eamzlialism 
Feminists working on law's ideological aspect have explored the ways 
in which law as a privileged state discourse reproduces, often 
indirectly, economic or sexual power through complex ideological 
processes, often involving non-state institutions such as "the family". 29 
The dominant('s) notion of the family - often referred to as the 
"traditional family" consists of two heterosexual parents and at least 
one child. Socialist feminism is the most comprehensive source for 
highlighting the connection between the familial institution "to the 
specificity of women's social, economic, and sexual subordination," 
which primarily developed with the rise of patriarchal, liberal and 
capitalist relations of power. 30 The state and legal support of familialism 
is evidenced in the sheer number of statutes which are based on this 
concept(ion). 31 
Key premises of the familial ideology include assumptions about 
the nuclear family as being naturally heterosexual, private and rooted in 
is a broad topic which can be divided into physical as opposed to mental disability, or a certain 
aspect of one's physical or mental condition. This is the sort of endless divisibility I want to 
avoid in this paper, although I acknowledge and apologize in advance for the possible dangers 
of alienation and essentialization in doing so. Further, I do not intend to explore 
comprehensively the intersection of lesbianism and race or class, but hope a more principled 
approach would provide a useful analysis by way of extrapolation or analogy. 
27 It is important to stress that I am trying to make a distinction between family or 
motherhood as a social reality or occwre11ce and the Family and Motherhood as an ideology. 
28 This will only be done on a broad scale in this section, whereas in the next section, 
specific examples will be taken. 
29 S.B. Boyd, "(Re)Placing the State: Family, Law and Oppression" (1994) 9 Can. J. L. & 
Soc. 39 at 60. 
30 S.A.M. Gavigan, "Paradox" supra note 23, at 594. 
31 See e.g. Bill 5, All Ac! lo amend certain statutes beca11se o/t/Je Supreme Coll!1 o/Ca11ada 
decision ri1 !11'. JJ. H, 1" Sess., 37'h Leg., Ontario, I 999 (assented to 28 October 1999, S.O. 
1999, c. 6), which changes the definition of spouse to include same-sex partners affects 67 
statutes in the one province alone. See also J. Ibbitson & R. Mackie, "Equal rights: Worth the 
price?" The Globe am! Mail (29 October 1999) A 18. 
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(re)productive, biological and gendered roles of"man and wife". 32 Thus, 
the dynamic of father as breadwinner and mother as (dependent) 
housewife who gives care and emotional support to children has led to 
numerous euphemisms and popular cultural idea(l)s: "Home as a haven 
in a heartless world"; women in the kitchen, barefoot and pregnant; "a 
man's home is his castle"; "a woman's place is in the home" (that is, in 
the man's castle and not her own). Some feminist commentators have 
exposed the fallacy of these assumptions and their lack of fit with the 
reality of "family" life: 
The family is both idealized and ideologized. Images abound of the 
ideal family, ranging from the extended family of days gone by; the 
"Father Knows Best" family; the family we think we remember from 
childhood; or the family as sanctioned by the Bible, the Koran, or the 
Torah. It is seldom, if ever, the family in which we actually live.33 
In short, our cun-ent notion of the "traditional family" is both 
historically and culturally contingent, perpetuated and reinforced by the 
media, religion and other social institutions - it is not just a social 
construct, but an inaccurate normative imposition. The Family, 
especially for women, has always been a site of contradiction, struggle, 
and sometimes violence34 or strength.35 Family forms have changed over 
time and continue to change in size, membership and dynamic.36 
32 See e.g. C. Smart, The Ties that Bi11d: Law, marriage and the reprod11ctio11 of patriarchal 
relation (London: Routledge, 1984 ); C. Smart, "Disruptive bodies and unruly sex: the 
regulation of reproduction and sexuality in the nineteenth century" in C. Smart, ed., 
Regulattizg Womanhood· Historical essays 011 marriage, motherhood and (London: 
Routledge, 1992) at 7; W.A. Wiegers, "Economic Analysis of Law and 'Private Ordering': A 
Feminist Critique" (1992) 42 University of Toronto L.J. 170. 
33 S. McDaniel, "The Changing Canadian Family: Women's Roles and the Impact of 
Feminism" in S. Burt et al, eds., Cha11gti1g Pattems: Women ti1 Canada, 2"" ed. (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1993) at 423. 
34 In 1991, wives killed by their husbands or heterosexual common law partners comprised 
the single largest group of domestic homicide. The same year, 43% of adult female victims of 
violence (of reported cases) were assaulted by their male partner. Statistics Canada, Housing, 
Family and Social Statistics Division, A Po!1rait ef Families ill Canada (Ottawa: Minister of 
Industry, Science and Technology, 1993) at 53-55. 
35 Black feminist academics have sometimes criticized white feminist portrayal of the 
family as essentially an institution of oppression because the family can often be a site of 
strength within a racist and white supremacist society. See e.g. b. hooks, "Homeplace: A Site 
of Resistance" in b. hooks, Yearmi1g: Race, ge11der and cultural politics (Toronto: Between 
the Lines, 1990) at 41, cited in S.A.M. Gavigan, "Paradox" supra note 23. By "footnoting" 
this observation and not addressing it in the main part of the paper, I do not mean to be 
relegating Black women's experiences to footnotes. 
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Regardless, the privatized traditional family37 remains a pervasive 
concept encoded in social and legal institutions and discourses. Indeed, 
when legal support is given to the Family, it is inevitably conditional on 
its continued privatization.38 The perpetuation of the public/private 
divide and a sexual division of labour can be seen in both the "private 
realm" -women's disproportionate share of domestic chores and child-
care - and in the "public" labour force with the advent of pink-collar 
ghettos, the glass ceiling, pay inequity, the double bind, and the under-
representation in political and legal positions of power. 39 However, for 
our purposes, the effect of the familial ideology and its concomitant 
gendered inequities upon marital dissolution and in the context of 
custody claims, are the most relevant. 
The purpose of the analysis is to show the fact that the Family is experienced differently by 
different people and thus the dominant ideology of familialism is erroneous and inadequate. 
The fact that many Black families do not conform to the dominant notions of women working 
solely in the home or men being the sole breadwinners actually suppo1is this observation. 
36 See Statistics Canada, Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division, Basic Facts 011 
Families tit Ca!lada, Pas! a!ld Preselll (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 1993) [hereinafter Basic 
Facts]: family size is decreasing and common-law parents are increasing, as are single parent 
families. See also Mossop, supra note 1, L'Heureux-Dube, J. 
Family fonns now and have always included single parent, two-parent, extended-family, 
blended-family, or other kinship based forms. In addition, more and more women are entering 
the paid labour force, two parent working families are the norm rather than the (stigmatized) 
exception. 
37 The Public/Private Dichotomy is a common term in feminist writings which refers to the 
traditional bifurcation of socially acceptable gender roles and, at another level, the extent of 
acceptable state (public) involvement in individual (private) lives. The "private" is 
traditionally associated with women, unpaid domestic work, and the home where individuals 
should be free to act without state regulation. The reluctance of government involvement to 
find a place in "the bedrooms of the nation" however, also resulted in very few and long-
awaited protections in addressing issues such as domestic violence. In contrast, the "public" 
realm is traditionally associated with men, waged labour and the marketplace. 
38 State involvement in divorce is a case in point. Judges are mandated to adjourn all 
proceedings if, in his or her opinion, there is any possibility of reconciliation between the 
parties. See DiJJorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2"d Supp.), c. 3, ss. 9-10. 
In a non-custody context, see the statutory entrenchment of spousal privilege in criminal 
proceedings in the Canada Evide!lce Ac!, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 4(3). This legal support for 
"marital harmony" privatizes all communications between a "wife or husband", while 
excluding protection for other family forms. 
39 See M. Luxton, T!trough lite Kilc!ten Wi!ldow (Toronto: Garamond, 1990). While these 
concepts are too complex to adequately address in this paper, there is much research and 
writing on the topic available. Suffice it for our purposes to say that the work of women tends 
to be undervalued and unrecognized, often at unacceptable social costs. 
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According to Statistics Canada, upon separation or divorce, the 
economic situation of ex-partners was drastically divided along 
gendered lines: 
The economic situation of spouses following separation or divorce 
differs greatly between men and women. One year after separation, 
women experienced an appreciable loss (-23%) in family income, 
adjusted for the number of family members. At the same time, men 
registered a gain of I 0% ... 
Two .fact01:r explain tlze gap: first, women generally earn less than 
me11, and thzts lose a major soztrce (}/financial support upon 
separation; second, most women lzave custody of clz1ldren upon 
separation. 
After one year of separation, women recovered a major portion of their 
losses. Five years after separation, however, women were still 5% or 
$1,000 below their pre-separation adjusted family income. In contrast, 
men gained 15% or $2,800 five years after separation.40 
This occurrence has led to the sociological concept of the "feminization 
of poverty".41 The first factor was explained above by showing how the 
gendered division of labour and ideology of familialism perpetuate 
economic, social and political inequality between the sexes. The second 
factor, however, requires further investigation into the ideology of 
motherhood, which, as an adjunct of familialism, persists with equal 
intensity after the dissolution of a relationship. 
iZ: Motherhood 
The ideologies of motherhood and familialism are necessarily 
interrelated due to the way each are constructed: without the "mother" 
there is no "family" of which to speak - it is her reproductive capacity, 
as well as her subordination by (and to) society through the ideology of 
motherhood which is at the core of familial ideology.42 The Mother is 
40 Statistics Canada, The Daily (9 April 1997), online: Statistics Canada <http:// 
www.statcan.ca/Daily/ English/970409/d970409 .htm> (date accessed: 15 November 1999) 
[emphasis added]. 
41 In 1991, 62% of female lone parent families had low incomes. Statistics Canada, Basic 
Facts, supra note 36 at 8. The "feminization of poverty" was also judicially noticed by 
L'Heureux-Dube in Moge v. Aloge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 853. 
42 I do not want to be taken as saying the ideology and culture of motherhood affect on/JJ 
biological mothers (women who have given birth); rather the negative effects are more 
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considered to be caring, nurturing, selfless, asexual, and committed to 
the sanctity of the Family; indeed, she should be willing to "cut off [her] 
head to save [her] babies."43 Although not all find this per se 
objectionable, the way that this image is constructed - the theoretical 
basis for it, its pervasiveness and the implications for women pursuing 
legal custody of their children - undoubtedly is. 
The enumerated characteristics listed above are socially 
constructed as being biologically determined by virtue of a woman's 
reproductive capacity; in other words, they are reduced to the "general 
concept of an essential, biologically determined 'maternal instinct' ."44 
In this view, childbirth necessitates the continued role of the mother as 
child-rearer; the two concepts are inextricably linked through biology. 
This portrayal of all mothers and all women as submissive only to their 
child(ren) and their families can also be problematized in contrast to the 
expected roles of fathers within the family. Tied to the sexual division of 
labour and the public/private divide, childcare is seen as "natural" 
indeed, biologically compulsory for a mother, whereas participation 
by men in child care or other domestic roles is seen as benevolent and 
generous behaviour. 45 By fulfilling the "bread winning" /provider 
function, the fatherly familial duties are discharged. 
Whereas this construction currently tends to favour women in 
custody disputes,46 there are harsh consequences for failing to reflect this 
image. Around the late nineteenth centmy, any adulterous behaviour by 
a wife would result in a determination of "unfitness" to parent; she was 
viewed as devious (having "betrayed" the family institution), dirty or 
sexual (having had sexual relations with someone other than her 
widespread where women, as women, and as potential pregnant women as mothers, are 
constructed in the same way. A woman's biological inability or choice not to give birth is often 
ignored. Further, an aspect of this construction is pervasive in that a woman's worth is often 
measured by her procreative ability: girls and women are bombarded with the socio-cultural 
message that it is their "destiny" to become mothers. 
43 S. Bordo, "Are Mothers Persons?" in S. Bordo, Unbeamble Weight:femli?ism, !Yes/em 
c!fllure, and the body (California: Regents, I 993) at 83. 
44 J. Brophy, "Child care and the growth of power: the status of mothers in child custody 
disputes" in J. Brophy & C. Smart, eds., Women-in-Low: Explorations in !011; Jtm1i(F olld 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) at I 07. 
45 S. A. McDaniel, supm note 33, at 434. 
46According to Statistics Canada, The Dai(F ( 18 May I 999), online: Government of Canada 
<http://www.statcan.ca/ Daily/English/ 9905 I 8/d9905 I 8b.htm> (date accessed ( 15 November 
1999): 
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husband), and selfish (she has put her own desires ahead of the sanctity 
of the family life).47 Similar penalties were not imposed on a father 
seeking custody. He further had the benefit of a paternal right to keep 
"his" children. 48 
With the rise of the "Tender Years Doctrine" in the early twentieth 
century, these stereotypes continued to play a role in custody 
dete1minations, even though there was now a maternal preference for 
young children. Susan Boyd describes the negative implications of the 
doctrine: 
Although [the judicial view of mothers under the tender years doctrine 
placed] women on a pedestal as parents, they were considered only as 
mothers rather than complete human beings. In turn, any deviation 
from the 'ideal' vision of motherhood such as leaving a child in the 
care of another person, working outside the home, or engaging in an 
adulterous relationship could defeat the maternal preference.49 
After the enactment of the 1986 Divorce Act, the law has since been 
changed to gender-neutral, non-fault based grounds of divorce and 
custody, however, this approach fails to recognize systemic sexism in 
the public sphere, while simultaneously regulating the Mother's place in 
the private sphere.5° For example, economic standard of living may be 
taken into account within the broad test of "best interests of the child" 
In 1997, there were 39,204 divorce cases involving a custody order for 
dependent children, almost half of the total number of divorces granted. 
Custody was granted to the wife in 61.2% of these cases, far ahead of joint 
custody to both husband and wife (27.6%) or custody to the husband 
(11.0%). It should be noted that in many cases not involving a custody 
order, residential arrangements are negotiated by parents outside of formal 
court proceedings. 
However, these numbers can be compared to the statistics gathered in 1988: mothers 
received custody 76.1 % of the time in comparison to 12.4% of fathers and 11.2% of the time 
when there was a joint custody order. Statistics Canada, Basic Facts, supra note 36 at 17. 
47 J. Brophy, sztpra note 44, at 103. See also S. Boyd, "From Gender Specificity to Gender 
Neutrality? Ideologies in Canadian Child Custody Law" in C. Smart & S. Sevenhuijsen, eds., 
Child Custoc(y Law and the Politics of' Gender (London: Routledge, 1989) at 131-32. 
48 Ibid. 
49 S. Boyd, "Gender Specificity to Gender Neutrality? Ideologies in Canadian Child 
Custody Law" in C. Smar1 & S. Sevenhuijsen, eds., Child Custody Law and the Politics ol 
Ge11der (London: Routledge, 1989) at 134. 
50 Primary care giving is a factor in the test; see You11g, sztpra note 11. In this sense, the 
sexual division of labour has tended to favour women, but often at unacceptable and sexist 
costs. 
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and balanced with factors such as availability to the child. 51 This 
conceals the sexual division of labour and gender discrimination in the 
workplace under a veil of formal equality. The gendered wage gap in the 
labour force may require women to work more hours for less pay than 
their male counterparts, and thus disadvantaged under both the factors of 
economics and time. Further, if a mother is involved in the paid 
workforce, this tends to mitigate against her ability to be a "good 
mother", especially if the father can provide a substitute mother figure. 52 
Thus, the public/private divide engendered in family law by the 
ideology of familialism, combined with a woman's failure to "fit" into 
the defined boundaries of "mother'', will still often result in her losing an 
order for custody.53 
Crossing the boundary from "good mother" to "bad mother" is a 
mark of significant shame and stigma in our society. As will be now 
discussed, the interaction of the dominant ideologies of familialism and 
motherhood with the system of heterosexism constructs the "lesbian 
mother" as an almost de facto "bad mother" and a rebuke to the 
traditional family. 
51 See e.g. Foleyv. Foley, [1993] N.S.J. No. 347 at paras. 19-20 (S.C.). 
52 See e.g. JJ:objiv. Sa11da110, [1994] B.C.J. No. 469 where a woman who worked full-time 
as a MLA was denied custody of her three children. Custody was granted to the father, a 
grocery clerk, whose mother lived next door. On application two years later, ([1996] B.C.J. 
No. 1461) the judge noted that while Tyabji's current unemployment was a significant factor 
in favour of altering the custody order, her "aggressive" tendencies had not changed (i.e. she 
continued to assert that her children were not healthy despite the views of two doctors) and she 
was insensitive to the best interests of her children. The comments implied that she was 
conniving (by not requesting maintenance for the oldest child should she be granted custody, 
as this was perceived as attempting to sever the child's tie from his father) and selfish (by 
tendering into evidence a letter from one of the children which stated that he wanted to live 
with her this was seen as "embroil[ing]" him in the dispute). Further, blame was put on the 
mother for re-raising the custody issue at all because of the detrimental effects it was having on 
the oldest child. 
For a comprehensive critique of l);abji and an analysis of the relationship between working 
mothers and child custody law, see S.B. Boyd, "Looking Beyond 7)1obji: Employed Mothers, 
Lifestyles, and Child Custody Law" in S.B. Boyd, ed., Challengli1g the Public/Pri1w!e Divide: 
Feminism, Low and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 253. 
53 l!tft-a Part III. Cultural differences can also play a role in state regulation of the ideology 
of motherhood. The intervention of child welfare services in the families of women of colour 
were and are often based on colonialist, racist, and imperialist assumptions of dominant 
mothering nonns. See T. Das Gupta, "Families of Native Peoples, Immigrants, and People of 
Colour" in N. Mandell & A. Duffy, eds., Canadian Families: DiJJersify, C01r/lict a11d Change 
(Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1995). 
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fit: Heteronormativity 
Like the binary oppositions of man/woman, father/mother, public/ 
private, the dualism of heterosexual/homosexual is constructed as 
normatively prioritized and mutually exclusive. The former has been 
naturalized in our society while the latter, vilified. This results in what 
Adrienne Rich calls a culture of "compulsory heterosexuality". 54 
In a mutually reinforcing cycle, social, legal and political 
ideologies of the family, motherhood, and heterosexuality continue to 
convey the stereotype of non-heterosexual individuals as inherently 
sexualized - indeed reduced to their sexual orientation. As a recent 
example, the Supreme Court of Canada's rejection of Brian Mossop's 
claim of discrimination based on family status left the implicit 
conclusion that gay and lesbian individuals cannot claim on any ground 
except sexual orientation; all other grounds were heterosexualized. 55 
Lesbian women may experience a particular form of oppression through 
this process, in that they are figuratively trapped at a crossroads between 
sex and sexual orientation discrimination in the context of a hetero-
p a triarc hal society where male domination is valorized and 
heterosexuality as an ideology is naturalized. 56 The inability to "fit" in a 
categorical box may cause increased complications in the litigation 
conversation because the decision maker cannot or will not understand 
lesbian women's experiences of multiple discrimination. 
The sexualization of lesbian women has a historical basis, 
stemming from the medicalization of lesbianism in the late nineteenth 
century, which led to the immense regulation and over-scrutinization of 
the lives of lesbian women in the otherwise insulated "private" sphere of 
the Family. Due to the pervasive Victorian notion denying female 
sexuality, "lesbianism" appears to have not "existed" prior to the end of 
the nineteenth century when, as an "outgrowth of and a reaction to 
capitalism, feminism, and the writings of sexologists," it was named. 57 
54 A. Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence," (1980) 5 Signs 631. 
55 See N. Duclos [now Iyer], "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of 
Social Identity" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 179. 
56 See Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, Vriendv. Alberta, [1998] I S.C.R. 493 
(Intervener's factum at 11-13). 
57 K. Martindale, "What makes lesbianism thinkable?: Theorizing lesbianism from 
Adrienne Rich to Queer Theory" in N. Mandell, ed., Femtilist Issues: Race, Class and 
Sexuality (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1995) at 71. 
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Because it challenged the patriarchal ideas of female dependence and 
lack of personhood,58 lesbian sexuality became seen as "deviant". 
Sexologists in a patriarchal context united notions of the "bad" woman 
(and "bad" mother - i.e. one in touch with her own sexuality) with the 
"lesbian".59 Named, categorized, and pathologized, lesbians were 
stigmatized for deviating from the assigned gender role of dependency 
on paternal and patriarchal hegemonic power. 
This hierarchy of sexualities complicates lesbian engagement with 
the law, particularly family law. Perceived as "sexualized" beings, 
lesbian women do not fit the paradigm of Mother - an asexual and 
selfless entity. Further, lesbian women act as a challenge to the notion of 
the naturally heterosexual Family and a woman's assigned dependent 
role within it. This challenge has often been seen as a threat to the "basic 
social institution"60 of society. 
Through its support of the Family and its regulation of women as 
mothers, legal discourse is par1icularly pervasive in the context of 
lesbian women claiming custody of children. When the ideologies of 
heteronormativity, familialism, and motherhood interact, the result is 
58 The history of the matrimonial prope1iy and divorce law is a prime example of the law's 
enforcement of patriarchal idea(l)s. See J.D. Johnston, Jr., "Sex and Prope1iy" ( 1972) 17 
N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1033; L. Holcombe, Wives and Property: Refen11 of the Aiarried Womans 
Property Law /t1 Mi1eteenth-Cellllfly England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983). 
59 This naming process denied the historical and contemporary existence of "romantic 
friendships" and "Boston marriages" which are long-term, intimate, monogamous woman-
woman relationships which are devoid of genital sex. See also M. Foucault, The Hist01y of 
Sext1ali(p (New York: Vintage Books, 1990). 
60 Mtivn v. Tmdel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 at 448, Gonthier J. In the course of his dissenting 
judgment, Gonthier J. cited an 1888 case of the United States Supreme Comi to support his 
argument that there could be "relevant" distinctions under the section 15 equality analysis on 
the basis of biological differences or for the protection of "fundamental values": 
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to 
do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, 
has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body 
prescribes the age at which parties may contract to man-y, the procedure or 
form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, 
its effects upon the prope1iy rights of both, present and prospective, and 
the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution. 
[MmTiage] is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity 
the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of 
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress. 
90-DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
the construction of lesbian relationships as non-families and lesbian 
mothers as non-mothers. 
II. THE Soc10...Jurun1cAL AcTORS 
The following analysis takes a quasi-historical and empirical61 
approach towards revealing the intertwining of the ideologies of 
familialism, motherhood, and heteronormativity in the discourse of law. 
I will show how the law has worked to support the oppression of sexual 
minonties taking lesbian mothers as an example - through various 
analytical approaches. To embark on this analysis I have divided this 
section into three periods: pre-Charter. 197 4-1984;62 early Charter. 
1985-1994; and late-Charter: 1995-1999. 
It is notable that the area of custody law tends to insulate itself from 
Charter scrutiny within broad tests of discretion - in fact, in the 
following cases, the judges never even cite the Charter for reference. 
Having said this however, it is apparent that the Law as a whole acts as a 
legitimizing and powerful discourse in social life and the Charter's 
effect on social and judicial attitudes and behaviours cannot be easily 
overlooked. While the Charter is not directly applicable to the decisions 
of trial court judges, 63 the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that 
Charter values should be considered when making custody 
determinations.64 Thus, using the Charter- specifically, section 15 - as 
61 I have attempted a comprehensive survey of the case law, however, I have encountered 
certain practical ban-iers, including unreported cases or judicial silence regarding the sexual 
orientation of the parties. Fmiher, a large number of custody arrangements are privately 
negotiated and it can be speculated, especially in the earlier cases, that a lesbian mother would 
prefer to agree to a less preferable arrangement than confront the homophobia of the court or 
be unwillingly "outed" in legal proceedings. (See K. Arnup, "Living in the Margins: Lesbian 
Families and the Law" in K. Arnup, ed., Lesbiall Farenth1g: livli1g with pride a!ld pn:judice 
(Charlottetown: gynergy, 1995) at 379 [hereinafter "Living in the Margins"].) This reality of 
situations of considerable inequality of bargaining power especially emphasizes the need for a 
fair and just approach to be taken by judges in this context. 
62 Once again, I would like to reiterate that I am not attempting to reify lesbian existence 
through the law, but the illustrate the way the law has dealt with lesbian existence when 
confronted with it in this context, at these specific times. 
63 RWDSUv. Dolphill De!iFe1y, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. 
6, You!lg supra note 12. 
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a socio-historical referent is not to valorize or overstate its impact on 
social life, but to rationalize the different approaches taken by judges in 
"factoring in" a mother's sexual orientation when evaluating custody 
cases. 
1. Pre Ckarter-1974-1985-Likes Alike 
In contrast to dominant biologically determined and medicalized 
stereotypes of the Lesbian, the law has traditionally preferred to relegate 
lesbian existence under a veil of invisibility.65 When this veil is lifted, 
the law tends avoid biological pronouncements on one's sexual identity, 
but is still influenced by heterosexist assumptions and tends to 
emphasize the difference (read: deviance) of lesbians in other ways.66 
The judges in this period prefer an Aristotelian conception of equality or 
a "similarly situated" test. In other words, a lesbian mother would not be 
the same as or similarly situated with a heterosexual mother, thus, she 
65 See K. Amup, '"Mothers Just Like Others': Lesbians, Divorce, and Child Custody in 
Canada" (1989) 3 CJWL 18 at 19 [hereinafter "Mothers Just Like Others"]: 
Unlike homosexual men, lesbians have seldom been subject to formal 
legal prosecution. For the most part, lesbianism has been treated as a 
physical and emotional impossibility by lawmakers seeking to control 
other forms of 'immoral' activity. While legislators in nineteenth century 
England, for example, developed a great concern over the question of male 
homosexuality, they adopted an 'out of sight, out of mind' approach to 
relations between women. 
A few cases in this period dealt with claims by Children's Aid Societies for removing 
custody from mothers who are lesbians. However, these cases often dealt with many other 
factors such as alcoholism or negligent care, because of which it is difficult to assess how 
much weight was given to the mother's sexual orientation. For this reason, I will not be 
reviewing these cases in the body text, but it is useful to note that lesbianism was always 
considered a negative affect in the same way as alcoholism, drug use, or negligence in the care 
of children. Further, the courts appear to be grateful to not deal with the issue, but rather base 
their decision on more overt factors, once again relegating sexual orientation to an invisible 
issue. See Re A.S., [1982] O.J. No. 644 (Prov. Ct., Fam. Div.); JJemhardtv. JJemhardt(I 979), 
10 R.F.L. (2d) 32 (Man. Q.B.); Children's Aid Society ojOttawa-Car/eto11 v. S. Y., [1981] O.J. 
No. 1253 (Prov. Ct., Fam. Div.). 
66 This attitude was recently illustrated in the decision of Gonthier J. in lvfiron, supra note 
60, where he opened the door to the argument that 'relevant' biological distinctions will not be 
discriminatory, especially when to protect the 'fundamental values' of society, such as the 
institution of marriage. This is a direct illustration of the pervasive force of familialism in the 
law; the ideology prevents the judge to go any farther than its delineated bounds. Its 
construction as the "good" acts as an insurmountable barrier to any alternative experiences or 
discourses of "family". 
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need not be treated the same under the law. This likes/alike - unalikes/ 
unlike approach to equality is also reflected contemporaneously in the 
human rights jurisprudence of the period under the Bzl! ef Rights. 67 In 
short, the rationale of this time is that lesbian mothers are not "like" 
heterosexual mothers, unless they can better approximate the 
constructed caricature of the Mother, and thus should not be given the 
same treatment as other women who do. 
Case v. Casd58 was the first reported Canadian decision where a 
mother's sexual orientation was put before the court in a custody 
determination. In addressing the issue, MacPherson J. writes: 
"homosexuality on the part of a parent is a factor to be considered along 
with all of the other evidence in the case. It should not be considered a 
bar in itself to a parent's right to custody."69 The implication of this 
statement is that, while not an absolute bar, homosexuality is still seen as 
a negative factor. The judge then proceeds to assess Ms. Case's 
"irregular. .. way of life". 70 He notes that she had four "lesbian affairs", 
one which occurred "before and after the divorce". Further, she attended 
a "homosexual club in Regina and ... a homosexual club in Saskatoon 
where she is vice-president ... She frequently invites members of the club 
to her home in couples or singly." 71 
Other comments illustrate Mac Pherson J. 's perception of Ms. 
Case's credibility. "Untruths" or "exaggerations constituting untruths" 
consisted of: 
(1) Ms. Case's concern that the father was careless with his 
firearms. This was found to be an untruth because of the judge's 
own experience that people who are skilful with fireanns are 
also always very careful with them. Also, the judge took into 
account that Ms. Case had bought her ex-husband gifts relating 
to his hobby, "a fact which she did not deny and which is 
inconsistent with her alleged fear of the guns. "72 
67 See e.g. Bliss v. Canada (Attomey General), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, where it was found 
that "Any inequality between the sexes in this area [of pregnancy] is not created by legislation 
but by nature." 
6s (1974), 18 R.F.L. 132. 
69 Ibid. at 136. 
70 Ibid. at 138. 
71 Ibid. at 136. 
72 Ibid. at 136. 
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(2) Ms. Case's allegations that Mr. Case had beaten the children. 
The judge dismissed this claim and found that: "[h]e has 
disciplined them but not with unreasonable force." In 
recounting one incident put into evidence, the judge implied 
that this allegation was not merely an "exaggeration", but a 
calculated and devious complaint because when it occurred, 
"Mrs. Case had already decided to leave the father."73 
(3) Another incident of "exaggeration constituting untruth" cited 
by the judge occurred in 1968. Ms. Case had been residing in 
Florida with her daughter, Kimberley, and her partner, Ricky. 
He found that she did not return to Canada unwillingly, 
contrary to her testimony. While in Saskatoon, 
the father arrived, seized the child, pushed the mother 
around and left with the child. Mrs. Case was slightly hurt. 
The same night she took an aeroplane back to Miami 
alone. I am of the opinion that at that time she was more 
anxious to return to Ricky than she was concerned about 
her child. 74 
In writing this factual narrative, the judge effectively erased the 
physical violence experienced by Ms. Case when Mr. Case 
forcibly took her child. The implication is that Ms. Case's 
selfishness overshadowed this experience, as she wanted to 
hurry back to Miami to continue her "lesbian affair". The 
possibilities that she may have feared for her own safety if she 
were to confront the father, or that Ricky would be a source of 
solace and comfort for her after the conflict, were not 
canvassed in the reasons. 75 
Lastly, the judge speculated: "I have a strong feeling that [Ms. 
Case] hid Elaine Harris [her partner] from me and I do no know why."76 
This again implies deception on the part of Ms. Case, rather than fear or 
reluctance in subjecting her partner to a homophobic court or a grilling 
cross-examination. 
In the end, the judge granted custody to the father, with access to 
Ms. Case. He stated that Mr. Case "is a stable and secure and responsible 
73 ibid. at 136-37. 
74 ibid. at 137. 
75 ibid. at 136-37. 
76 ibid. at 138. 
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person" whereas Mrs. Case's "way of life is irregular ... She did not 
come forward with a clear plan for them ... I greatly fear that if these 
children are raised by the mother they will be too much in contact with 
people of abnormal tastes and proclivities. "77 The judge does not 
mention why Mr. Case is stable and responsible or what "plan" he had 
for the children. The impression from reading the judgment leads to a 
converse line of reasoning: because MacPherson J. had gone into such a 
deep analysis of why Ms. Case would be an unstable parent, then 
custody should go to the father. 
The governing factor for denying the mother custody in Case has 
been subject to a variety of interpretations. While some have seen it as 
the failure of Ms. Case to call her paiiner as a witness, 78 or her "unfair 
and exaggerated charges ... as to the father's conduct'', 79 most 
subsequent judgments on the issue tend to hinge on the judge's 
observation of Ms. Case's involvement with the lesbian community. 
The result has been the creation of a new dichotomy: the "good lesbian 
mother" versus the "bad lesbian mother." 
Good lesbian mothers, women who live quiet, discreet lives, who 
promise they will raise their children to be heterosexual, who appear to 
the outside world to be heterosexual single parents, have in recent 
years increasingly succeeded in winning custody of their children. 
"Bad" lesbian mothers, women who are open about their sexual 
orientation, who attend gay and lesbian demonstrations and other 
public events, and who view their lesbianism positively or as one 
aspect of an entire challenge to society, are almost certain to lose 
custody of their children to their ex-husbands.80 
In other words, while lesbianism "in itself is not a bar to custody'', 
mothers must ensure they inhibit any behaviours and attitudes which 
judges "would consider to be coterminous with lesbianism."81 They 
must over-compensate through strict conformity to the ideology of 
motherhood and familialism by having only "middle class values, 
middle-of-the-road political beliefs, repressed sexuality, and sex-role 
stereotyped behavior."82 
77 Ibid 
78 K. Arnup, "'Mothers Just Like Others"' supra note 65, at 26. 
79 Re Barkley and Barlrley (1980), 28 O.R. (2d) 136 (Prov. Ct., (Fam. Div.)). 
8° K. Amup, "Living in the Margins" supra note 61, at 382-83. 
81 K. Amup, "'Mothers Just Like Others"' supra note 65, at 26. 
82 K. Arnup, "Living in the Margins" supra note 61 at 383, citing N. Polikoff, "Lesbian 
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Almost all the cases of this period reflect this dichotomy and 
intense regulation of the mother's personal life. In Bezaire v. 
Bezake, 83custody was granted to the mother on first instance, but on 
three specific conditions only: (1) that she obtain a residence that will be 
fixed and stable; (2) that the father maintain "extremely liberal 
access ... because .. .it is extremely important that ... the father image be 
reinforced;" and (3) that Mrs. Bezaire does not reside with anyone else 
without the approval of the court, including "any open, declared, and 
avowed lesbian, or homosexual relationship."84 The rationale for this 
last decision is found in the trial judge's statement, despite psychiatric 
evidence before the court to the contrary: 
The homosexuality of one parent ... is a negative factor. .. [B]eing 
raised in a homosexual atmosphere, by a homosexual parent, who is 
openly associating with other homosexuals, must be considered by the 
Court as negative when one views the principles upon which this 
country was founded, and the beliefs held by a majority of society in 
this country.85 
Thus, McMahon J. made explicit the observations of the court in Case: 
lesbianism is not an absolute bar to custody in and of itself - it is the 
mother's "perogative, that is her privilege"86 - but it is a negative factor 
in custody determinations, and any behaviours indicative of lesbianism 
is to be considered not in the best interests of the child. 
Subsequently, Ms. Bezaire moved to Toronto from Windsor for 
employment purposes, and "entered into another living arrangement 
which clearly involved a homosexual relationship."87 As a result, the 
order was completely reversed in favour of the father and Ms. Bezaire 
lost an appeal despite strong evidence that the children were being 
abused by the father and the Official Guardian's support for returning 
custody to her. Thanks to independent academic commentary, other 
factors were revealed that were all but erased in the judgment, including: 
Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles, Legal Challenges," (1986) 14 Rev. o/ Law alld 
Social Change 907. 
83 [J 980] 0.J. No. 1320 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Bezmi-e]. 
84 Ibid. at para. 6, citing the trial court judgment which is unreported. 
85 Cited in K.A. Lahey, "On Silences, Screams and Scholarship: An Introduction to 
Feminist Legal Theory" in R.F. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives Oil Legal Theory 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) at 330. 
86 E!/10/t, i11fiv note 101. 
87 Bezati·e. sup1v note 83, at para. 8. 
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domestic violence towards Ms. Bezaire during the marriage and Mr. 
Bezaire's criminal conviction for it; Mr. Bezaire's abduction of the 
children after separation; his failure to pay child support for which he 
was jailed; child abuse occmTing while Mr. Bezaire had custody; and 
Mr. Bezaire' s utter resentment of Gayle Bezaire' s sexual orientation for 
which he wanted revenge. 88 How these circumstances may have 
impacted on Ms. Bezaire was not investigated at trial or on appeal. 
Further, the invasive conditions put on Ms. Bezaire's personal life and 
relationships was never questioned. 89 Ms. Bezaire broke the rules of the 
familialism game, she was a "bad mother" because she was a lesbian. 
In contrast, the courts in K v. K 90and Re Barkley and 
Bark/ey91 distinguished Case on the facts and granted custody to the 
mothers. However, the line of reasoning in Case and Bezaire is still 
strictly adhered to and the distinguishable facts are what make the 
judgments problematic. 
Rowe J. in K v. K found that Mrs. K. "is not a missionary about to 
convert heterosexuals" and her relationship "will be discreet and will 
not be flaunted to the children or to the community at large."92 Fmiher, 
as opposed to Case, Rowe J. received much more evidence from experts 
and witnesses as to Mrs. K.'s relationship with her daughter, her 
psychological "normality", and the fact that she is "not a crusader" nor a 
"preach[er]" of the joys of lesbianism.93 Lastly, "in the eyes of the 
community [Mrs. K. and her partner] are single parents living together 
by virtue of economic practicality" and thus, not "ove1i" about their 
relationship.94 Ms. K was judged to be a "good" lesbian mother. 
Similarly, in Re Barkley, Nasmith J. found that: "any possible ill 
effects for Lynn [the daughter] from her mother's sexual orientation 
have been minimized by the following circumstances: 
(I) She is not militant; 
88 K.A. Lahey, supra note 85, at 330-31. 
89 But see Bezake, supra note 83, at para. 26, Wilson J .A., dissenting,: 
I would like to add as an addendum to these reasons [ordering a new trial 
on the evidence] that in my view homosexuality is a neutral and not a 
negative factor as far as parenting skills are concerned. 
90 ( 1975), 23 R.F.L. 58 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) [hereinafter K]. 
91 (1980), 28 0.R. (2d) 136 (Prov. Ct., Fam. Div.) [hereinafter Re Barkl(:'J:]. 
92 K, supra note 90, at 63-64. 
93 K, stijJra note 90, at 61. 
94 K, stijJra note 90, at 60. 
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(2) She does not flaunt her homosexuality; 
(3) She does not seem to be biased about Lynn's orientation and 
seems to assume that Lynn will be heterosexual; 
(4) There is no overt sexual contact apart from sleeping in the same 
bed; 
(5) The sexual partner has a reasonably good relationship with the 
child."95 
Further, the daughter had expressed her preference to live with her 
mother. As with Ms. K., Ms. Barkley was a "good" lesbian mother: she 
closeted herself and her relationship for the interests of her child. 
There is little or no information about the fathers in the decisions, 
which focus almost exclusively on the mothers' ability to parent as 
lesbians. However, in K v. K, it was noted that the father's economic 
situation was one impediment. Apparently, psychological testing on him 
did not seem necessary. Further, there was evidence of drug use on his 
part to which Rowe J. thought fit to compare the mother's 
homosexuality. Another implicit factor however, is that neither Mr. K. 
nor Mr. Barkley presented the court with a smrogate mother figure as 
was done in future cases. This results in the court apparently picking the 
perceived lesser of two evils: a mother who is a lesbian - but discreet, 
overtly asexual, and consumed with love for her child, with a long tenn 
paiiner with the same characteristics - over a single father with greater 
economic responsibilities and duties in the "public sphere". 
Despite the fact custody was granted to these women, neither 
decision can be seen as a direct challenge to the ideologies of 
familialism, motherhood, or heteronormativity, only manipulations of 
them. It becomes a contest of smis between the parents: who ever can 
best approximate the ideal, "wins" custody. 
Monette c. Sylvestre, 96 a 1981 Quebec case, is an example of how 
the ideology of familialism can sometimes trump a successful 
confonnity to the "good" lesbian mother stereotype. Although Durocher 
J. spent half of the written judgment expounding the positive aspects of 
the mother's life, he granted the father's application to reverse a 
previous order and gave custody of the daughter to him. The father's 
claim was based on a material change of circumstances, namely, the 
95 Re Barkley. supra note 9 I, at 140. 
96 [1981] C.S. 731 (Que. S.C.) 
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mother's lesbianism, alleged sexual contact with the daughter, and the 
instability of her life. Durocher J. found that Ms. Sylvestre's sexual 
orientation as one factor to be considered with others and the allegations 
of incest were unfounded. While not dealing with the last charge 
specifically, he did say that her life was "quelque peu boheme."97 Thus, 
while noting that Ms. Sylvestre was a loving, attentive, discreet, and 
non-militant woman, that there was no promiscuity or exhibitionism in 
her home, that she had male friends as well as female friends, and that 
the daughter was intelligent and well adjusted, he decided it was 
"preferable de foumir a l'enfant un modele de familial complet ... 
l'enfant devrait avoir l'opportunite de vivre dans une cellule familiale 
complete, que notre societe considere comme ideale et normale."98 
The apparent basis for showing the stability of Mr. Monette' s life-
style was that he had remarried and "sa jeune epouse" was willing to act 
as a smTogate mother-figure to his daughter. Thus, the negative factors 
of the father's life -he had been married three times, for short periods in 
succession; he had a record of careless driving and once smoked 
marijuana while driving a friend and her two young children; his 
daughter got hit by a car and fractured her leg while under his 
supervision; he was bankrupt because of $12 000 arrears in support 
payments; and he had once considered suicide - were neutralized by the 
idea that he could provide a traditional heterosexual family 
environment. These indicia of instability were seen as "frivole et legere" 
in comparison to the mother's "choix personnel, quant a son orientation 
sexuelle".99 
In this case, the judge was supported in his decision by the 
psychiatrist called by Mr. Monette. The now inaccurate opinion 
provided by the expert was irresponsible and speculative, as he had only 
interviewed the father and the daughter. He found the father could 
provide a stable and secure emotional environment, whereas 
!es attitudes socials et !es opinions sexuelles de madame ... represent 
des dangers severes pour l'avenir affectif et psycho-sexuel de cette 
fillette ... [La mere doit] offrir a son enfant une image de femme sans 
confusion ne ambivalence dans son role sexuel. Autrement, il y a 
danger majeur de transmettre un modele feminine confus, de susciter 
97 !Nd. at 733. 
98 Ibid. at 734. 
99 Ibid. 
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le rejet du masculine .. [La vie avec Sylvestre dans un] milieu de 
promiscuite sexuelle est source de stimulation sexuelle premature et le 
modele matemel ambivalent et marginal. 100 
Thus, without having even observed or spoken with Ms. Sylvestre, 
the psychiatrist relied on sexualized stereotypes of lesbian women as 
promiscuous and "dangerous" mothers. Further, these vestiges of 19t1i 
century pathologization of lesbianism may have had strong persuasive 
force for the judge because of its excessive use of familial discourse. 
The judge's greatest fear appears to have been that the mother's 
lesbianism would be transmitted to the daughter and that Ms. Sylvestre 
would fail to comply with the ideology of motherhood by not 
reproducing gendered roles of femininity and male dependence in her 
daughter. 
Conversely, but with the same result, in Elliott v. E!liott101 the 
judge granted custody to the father by undermining and shedding doubt 
on the report of a family court counsellor who supported giving custody 
to the mother. According to the counsellor, Ms. Elliott and her partner 
had a stable, "conventional and discreet" relationship, they were doing a 
"better than average job" in caring for the child, and the child was 
enjoying the security of having "two compatible mothers around." 102 
Because the report did not thoroughly investigate the occasional 
marijuana use of the mother's partner, Trainor J. concluded that the 
counsellor's assessment contained "obvious omissions" .103 Further, in 
direct contrast to Monette, the potency of the report was diluted by the 
judge's note - without giving the actual amount of time - that "the 
length of time [the counsellor] was in the home and the basis upon which 
she could reach that conclusion [of the complementarities and 
compatibility of the women] seems to me to be rather slender."104 
No investigation was conducted on Mr. Elliott's home life and the 
only evidence apparently accepted by the judge was the fact that he had 
become engaged to Valerie Smith, "who will be his wife to share with 
him that home and the responsibilities of that home." 105 He appears to 
100 ibid. at 732. 
101 [1984] B.C.J. No. 1092 (B.C. S.C.). 
102 Ibid. at para. 6. 
103 ibid. 
104 Ibid. at para. 7. 
105 ibid. at para. 13. 
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balances only this - despite Ms. Elliott's testimony of physical conflict 
during the marriage and the disciplinarian attitude of the father with 
"the situation in which Mrs. Elliott is living, those circumstances, that 
atmosphere." 106 Nothing was cited beyond the criticisms of the court 
counsellor's report and the fact that Ms. Elliott allowed her daughter to 
go to the arcade, to support this ominous statement. What was mostly 
occurring was that, because the father could provide a traditional family 
model for the child, this, in and of itself, is sufficient to neutralize the 
mother's claim. 
In almost all of the cases, there was also the judicial need, not just 
to state the mother's sexual identity, but to make a prediction as to 
whether this would continue; 107 the underlying rationale being that if the 
woman has not strayed too far from the motherhood path, and may even 
get back on the heterosexual one, then she has a much stronger case. 
However, at the same time, the presence of a long-te1m partner further 
widened the gap between the "good lesbian mother" and the "bad 
lesbian mother". The "good" mother, with a long-term stable 
partnership, could either approximate a heterosexual family rubric or 
else pass off the relationship as two single parents living together for 
economic reasons. 108 Conversely, the "bad mother" was seen as selfish 
(by spending time with other women) and promiscuous (by having a 
certain number of "lesbian affairs", which was always noted in the 
judgment109). 
As a corollaiy of this, it is notable how extensive the investigation 
into the woman's sexual history goes, whereas there is usually little or 
no information about the man's relationships, 110 unless he is presenting a 
surrogate mother to the comi to improve his case. 111 By remarrying, and 
providing a substitute heterosexual mother figure, the father gives the 
court an impression of greater stability and "normality'', in accordance 
io6 Ibid. 
107 E//ioll, ibid. at para. 5;.Case, supra note 68 at 136; K, supm note 90 at 62. 
108 E//iolt, ibid.; K, supm note 90; Re supm note 91. 
109 See Case, supra note 68 at 136, Bezaire, supra note 83 at para. 5. 
110 There could be many possible reasons for this I suppose, such as the man has not 
engaged in any other relationships or perhaps the mother is not as interested in putting these 
before the court. One other possibility is that, regardless of evidence before the court, the 
judge does not perceive the information as relevant as the mother's sexual history to merit 
including in the judgment. 
111 1Wone!le, supra note 96, El/iolt, supm note 101, Bemhardt, supra note 65. 
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with the working assumptions of the ideology of familialism. This 
ignores the legal barrier in most jurisdictions that preclude same-sex 
partners from marriage, thus reinforcing heteronormative ideology. 
Further, the infonnation there is about the father usually consists of his 
employment status, in other words, his station in the "public" world. 112 
This regulation and vigilance over women's personal and sexual lives 
can also be seen as a direct adjunct of the ideology of familialism the 
public/private divide and paternalistic patriarchy. 
The case of Johnson c. Rochette1 13 is an interesting case from 
Quebec and a harbinger of the analytical shift which would occur with 
the passing of the Canadian Charter. Similar restrictive orders were 
placed on the visitation rights of the mother at trial as were included in 
Bezaire. The judge ordered that she could only visit her children in the 
absence of her partner. This clause was deleted on appeal as contrary to 
section I 0 of the Quebec Charte. However, the appeal judge also noted 
that the deletion was appropriate primarily because "it was not even 
alleged that there had been any reprehensible attitudes or gestures in the 
presence of the children or that the wife had acted in a manner not 
becoming a normal mother." 114 Thus, while overt discriminatory 
distinctions were avoided regarding the personal characteristics of the 
mother, the "good"/"bad" lesbian mother dichotomy persevered by 
assessing her "lesbian" behaviours. While her sexual orientation is seen 
as a privatized "choice", its possible effects on children give the court 
free reign to regulate and assess her actions and activities. 115 This trend 
continues in the next period. 
II. EARLY CHARTER - 1985-1994 - DIFFERENCE BLINDNESS 
The legal context of this time is important to note. Section 15 of the 
Charter came into force in April of 1985 and, since then, the Supreme 
112 Elliot!; sl!pra note I 0 l, K, sl!pra note 90, Re Barkley, supra note 9 I . 
113 [1982] C.S. 407, 27 R.F.L (2d) 380. 
114 Ibid. at 380. 
115 This is an example of the way liberalist and moral conservatist theories interact in the 
law. The "protect the children" discourse construct children as a "public" issue, and although 
the sexuality of the mother is "private", the paternalistic interventions become justified in law 
via the "best interests of the child" test. 
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Court of Canada has consistently affirmed its commitment to 
substantive equality. Further, the 1986 Divorce Act had also been passed 
expressly rejecting fault-based or parental rights approaches in favour of 
the best interests of the child test. Even though this test was used 
provincially and judicially, Parliament had shown its intention that the 
test was now to be the uniform and paramount consideration in custody 
disputes nationally. However, this period is prior to the Egan decision 
which added sexual orientation as an analogous ground. Mossop was the 
only case from the Supreme Court of Canada on sexual orientation, and 
the majority explicitly rejected his claim as "family". Lastly, the 
political climate is also important; in Ontario, a proposed bill to change 
the definition of "spouse" in the Human Rights Code and the 
Jnte1pretation Act was defeated on the second reading. 116 
The main approach taken by the courts in this era was to name the 
lesbianism of the mother, yet expressly reject it as a negativing factor. 
This is a contrast to the pre-Charter period where homosexuality, while 
not a sole bar to custody was still a negative factor on par with drug use, 
and sometimes worse than child abuse. However, while a mild 
improvement, the dichotomy between acceptable and unacceptable 
(lesbian) behaviours remained hidden underneath the neutral words of 
the courts. 
Susan Boyd outlines three areas of possible "heterosexist bias" 
encoded within judicial "neutrality" when applying the best interests 
test in the context oflesbian relationships. 117 First, because "stability" is 
often a factor of consideration, family fonns which are "different from 
the heterosexual norm" could influence the assessment of a "pem1anent 
and stable family unit."118 However, the bar against same-sex marriage, 
the closeted nature of lesbian relationships, and the absence of clear 
statistical infonnation119 all militate against challenging stereotypes of 
116 Bill 167. For a commentary, including negative public reaction to the bill, see S.B. 
Boyd, "Expanding the 'Family' in Family Law: Recent Ontario Proposals on Same Sex 
Relationships" (1994) 7 CJWL 545 [hereinafter "Expanding the Family"]. 
117 S.B. Boyd, "Lesbian (and Gay) Custody Claims: What Difference Does Difference 
Make?" (1997) 15 Can. J. Fam. L. 131at137-39 [hereinafter "Lesbian Custody Claims"]. 
i1s Ibid. 
119 Statistics Canada has announced that the year 2000 will be the first year when same sex 
relationships will be explicitly recognized. See V. Lawton, "Same Sex Legislation is Expected 
this Week" The Toro11!0 Star (8 February 2000), online: Foundation for Equal Families <http:/ 
/www.ffef.ca/main.htm> (date accessed: 23 March 2000). 
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promiscuity and instability of homosexual relationships. Second, "being 
in the closet may produce behaviour that is viewed as secretive or 
devious." 120 Thirdly, "a lesbian mother is viewed as placing her own 
needs over those of her child(ren) by choosing to be a lesbian and 
adopting a 'lesbian lifestyle. "'121 To this list I would also add that the 
strict formal equality approach assumes both parents are equal in all 
ways, and that the standard to be measured against is the heterosexual 
norm. 
This newfound neutrality towards sexual orientation has resulted in 
courts both recognizing and erasing lesbian existence at once, and the 
problems enumerated above are evident in almost all the decisions. 
There are even fewer reported cases in this period, 122 which could 
possibly be a consequence of judges refusing to recognize the sexual 
orientation explicitly while allowing it to influence their reasons, or a 
general reluctance to having to deal with it at all. 
In Tomenelcv. Tomanelc 23 and Da!!erv. Da!!er124 both courts were 
willing to avoid the issue of sexuality completely and treat it as a "non-
issue"125 or else non-existent126 in granting custody to the mothers. In the 
120 S.B. Boyd, "Lesbian Custody Claims" supra note 117. 
121 S.B. Boyd, "Lesbian Custody Claims" supra note 117. 
122 Again, I will not be dealing with extremely complicated cases that deal with issues such 
as alcohol or drug abuse. It is interesting to note, however, that in these cases the mother's 
sexuality was seen as contributing to her other"psychological and emotional" problems which 
prevented her from having custody of her child and instead granting custody to a (heterosexual 
and two parent) foster family. See Adams v. Woodbll!y, [1986] B.C.J. No. 2735 (S.C.); 
Children '.r Aid Society o/ Halifax v. A. (M), [1986] N.S.J. No. 423 (Fam. Ct.); Ma11iloulin v. 
P.D., [1995] O.J. No. 1985 (C.J., Prov. Div.). 
Further, I will also not deal with disputes between lesbian couples that are separating 
and have children. The cases in this context tend to not involve custody, but centre around 
assets and support. See Anderson v. Luoma, [1986] B.C.J. No. 3000 (S.C.) affd [1987] B.C.J. 
No. 600 (C.A.); M(D.E.) v. S(7:f.J) (1996), 25 R.F.L. (4'11) 264 (Sask. Q.B.); Monlcv .• 
[1996] S.J. No. 411 (Q.B., Fam. Div.); Re L.KF., [1999] B.C.J. No. 819 (S.C.); Be/Iv. Michie, 
[1998] O.J. No. 675 (C.J. (Gen. Div.). But see Buislv. Greaws, [1997] O.J. No. 2646 (C.J., 
Gen. Div.) where the non-biological mother was denied custody and a declaration that she was 
a "mother" under the law, but ordered to pay child support. 
Lastly, the case of Rober/son v. Geisinger, [1991] S.J. No. 515 (Q.B.) is also beyond 
the scope of this paper. This case involved a custody dispute between a gay father and a lesbian 
mother. While neither party put sexual orientation into issue, it is notable that the mother's 
"stable" and long-term relationship was compared to the sexual histo1y of the father. 
123 [1993] O.J. No. 1371 (Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Tomanek]. 
124 [1988] 0.J. No. 2116 (H.C.J.) [hereinafter Daller]. 
125 /bid 
126 Tomanelt; supra note 123. 
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facts of each case, the claiming fathers in both cases had a great deal of 
animosity towards the mothers and would use and manipulate the 
children as tools against them, specifically targeting their lesbianism; 
emotional abuse or harassment and threats were also present. Thus, the 
overt behaviour of the fathers was recognized as a negative factor. 
However, in making the orders, there were few concomitant positive 
characteristics attributable to the mothers. It is interesting to note the 
mere equivocal or strictly neutral characterization of the mothers' 
relationships; these forms were not valorized or privileged as 
unequivocally stable and permanent family forms as were the remarried 
heterosexual fathers in previous cases. 
By contrast, in Ewanldw v. Ewan/dw, 127 the judge penalized the 
mother for not "outing" herself in court; indeed he took it upon himself 
to do so. He rejected the mother respondent's testimony that she was not 
a lesbian or in a lesbian relationship with her roommate and used this 
denial to undermine her abilities as a parent: 
Both the mother and Tracy Scheel deny that they are having a lesbian 
relationship. This is in spite of overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary ... 
The sexual preference of the mother is her own business and is not 
relevant to the issue of care and control. However, what is relevant to 
the issue of care and control is the mother's lying. The mother lied 
throughout her testimony. I am satisfied that dishonesty is an integral 
part of her life. This mother is a stranger to the truth! 128 
This assessment may have failed to take into account the discrimination 
faced by lesbian women in society and in the legal system. The judge 
was not able to understand why a woman may want to stay in the closet 
for custody proceedings despite the legacy of Gayle Bezaire and 
previous custody cases. 
The inability of the judge to comprehend or translate alternative 
discourses is illustrated in other parts of the decision as well. For 
example, Diamond J. refused to accept the women's testimony as to the 
first eight months of their relationship, despite the fact that "there is no 
evidence to contradict" them: 
127 [1994] M.J. No. 692 (Q.B.). 
128 ibid. at paras. 20-21. 
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They apparently met in July of 1992, when Ms. Scheel, who was 
disguised as a man, was introduced to the mother as 'Bo Bodine'. 
After the separation, the mother and Ms. Scheel, who was still 
disguised as 'Bo Bodine' became very good friends ... It was not until 
February of 1993, upon the mother confronting her friend as to her 
true identity, that Ms. Scheel confirmed that she was not a man and 
that her name was not 'Bo Bodine'. Truth is stranger than fiction! If 
this bizarre situation is in fact true, it reflects badly upon the mother's 
judgment in becoming best friends and roommates with a person who 
was dishonest. 129 
According to Judith Butler, performatives such as drag, are often 
political actions used to challenge and subvert traditional gendered 
dualisms: "[ q]ueer theorists can further subvert [sexed and gendered] 
identities through the exploration of practices such as drag, butch-
femme roles, cross-dressing, transsexuality, and the proliferation of 
erotic minorities, performed as self-conscious and voluntary 
parodies."130 This failure to assimilate naturalized and socially assigned 
roles of (heterosexual) Woman or Mother strikes at the very heaii of 
these naturalizations and assignments, however, as in Ewanldw, this 
failure can often have drastic consequences when untranslatable by 
those with power. 
Similarly, in S v. S, 131 Melnick J. refused to understand why Ms. 
S. wanted to move to Vancouver from a small town in British Columbia, 
and eventually he trivialized any reasons she had and reduced them to 
her lesbianism. In his decision, he explicitly stated: 
The parties may be expecting a lengthy analysis of the appropriateness 
of lesbians or homosexuals having sole custody of children. I do not 
intend to provide such an analysis because it is not necessary ... I start 
from the base assumption that being a lesbian or a homosexual does 
not, in itself, make a person unfit to be a parent or have custody of a 
child ... [T]he state of development of Ms. S.'s awareness and 
experience of her being a lesbian has had some impact on my decision, 
but I wish to state very clearly that the same state of affairs could well 
have been brought about, in another case, by an entirely different 
cause. 132 
i29 Ibid. 
13° Cited in Martindale, supra note 57 at 88. 
131 [1992] B.C.J. No. 1579 (S.C.). 
i32 Ibid. 
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This facially neutral position, and the assumption that the situation and 
judgment would be the same if, for example, she was moving to foster a 
new family unit with a new husband, 133 is belied by his other statements. 
Ms. S. set out several reasons for wanting to move if she were 
granted custody, the desire to "seek out new relationships so that she 
could experience her lesbianism" was only one of five stated reasons. 
However, the judge hinged on this in particular and characterized it as 
"an important, even essential, adventure for her. .. not an adventure the 
children should be part of." Thus, while sounding neutral, and even 
supportive of Ms. S.'s "need to be open about the fact that she was a 
lesbian", Melnick J. also denied custody to her on this ground. Her 
"adventure" was seen as selfish, personal and not in the best interests of 
her children: 
Ms. S.'s wish to move was, for the most part, grounded in her own 
personal needs, not those of her children ... Ms. S. [is] so intent on 
moving away and so wrapped up in her own need to do so that she is 
blind to the needs of her children ... 134 
Lastly, as a throwback to previous cases, the presence of a 
"girlfriend" in Mr. S. 's life also supported the judge's assumption of 
stability in the father's life, even though the children did not get along 
with her. As to Ms. S. 's future, he stated: 
I have no idea as to the shape of the relationship or relationships yet to 
be established by Ms. S. and how that will impact on the children ... A 
move with Ms. S. to the Lower Mainland, particularly given Ms. S.'s 
present need to explore her lesbian nature, will not now, in the 
immediate future, provide anything approaching that which has been 
normal or stable in [the children's] lives. 135 
Thus, while couched in te1ms of judicial neutrality and fo1mal 
equality, the same "good"/"bad" lesbian mother dichotomy remains 
pervasive between the lines. The implicit message is that, if Ms. S. truly 
133 Parental mobility is a complex area of family law, however, the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal has recognized the importance of fostering a new family unit, even if this entails 
reducing the access of the non-custodial parent, see Blois v. Blois ( 1988), 13 R.F.L. (3d) 225 
(N.S. C.A.). While the Supreme Court of Canada has found that the reason for the parent's 
move should be considered irrelevant (see Gordon v. Goe1'fz (1996), 19 R.F.L. (4'h) 177 
(S.C.C.)), it undoubtedly acts as at least an implicit consideration. 
134 S. v. S:, szipra note 131. 
13s S. v. S:, szipra note 131. 
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wanted to keep her children, she should have agreed to live in a place she 
never wanted to move, suppress her need to be open with her lesbianism, 
and assimilate into a heterosexualized model of a relationship. To take 
this route and to make these personal sacrifices still remain the most 
successful way of getting custody. 
In D.M v. MD. 136 and N v. N, 137 both lesbian women were 
awarded custody by the court. They were in long-term and discreet 
relationships. In D.M the judge only looked summarily at the mother's 
relationship in three short paragraphs before granting the respondent's 
lesbian aunt custody of the children. The biological mother had two 
other children, lived at her parents' house and had some emotional and 
psychological impediments. While the case is a mild improvement, in 
that the judge did not delve deep into the aunt's life-style, the factors 
governing his decision were that: 
these two women ... were neither apologetic 138 nor aggressive about 
their relationship. They are very discreet. They make no effort to 
recruit others to their way of living. They make no special effort to 
associate with others who pursue that lifestyle. In short, D.M. and H.S. 
mind their own business and go their own way in a discreet and 
dignified way ... 
. . . There may be a problem of the absence of a male presence, but this 
is no worse ... than many single parent families. 139 
Thus, although recognizing the existence of other family forms, the 
judge still fails to challenge the traditional ideal. Single-parent families 
and two-parent lesbian families are still problematic in his mind. 
In N v. N, the judge also implicitly privatized the mothers lesbian 
relationship by emphasizing the covert nature of the relationship. 
However, while he did not explicitly reject the father's position that, all 
things being equal between the parties, Ms. N.'s lesbianism would tip 
the scales in the father's favour, he did not apply it as a strict rule of law 
as was done in the past. Because there was no evidence of a detrimental 
136 [1990] S.J. No. 679 (Q.B.) [hereinafter D.M]. 
137 [1992] B.C.J. No. 1507 (S.C.) [hereinafter N.]. 
138 But see J.E.B. v. R.G.B., [1996] B.C.J. No. 2717 (S.C.) where the mother repeatedly 
expressed her shame in engaging in a short "affair" with another woman. She was granted 
primary care and control. 
139 D.M, supra note 136, at paras. 12-13. 
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impact, Warren J. did not find the lesbian relationship to be a bar to 
custody. 
It is uncertain on whom the burden of leading evidence is to fall 
upon. One would assume that, since it is to act as a challenge against the 
mother's ability to parent, the father should bear the onus. However, in 
line with strict liberalist approaches, it may be that the mother will have 
to justify her "choice" to lead a lesbian lifestyle and to explain to the 
court how she plans to protect her child from a homophobic society. The 
latter option was ce1iainly predominant in past cases and those from this 
period, and this is a predominant area where formal equality fails lesbian 
women claiming custody. 140 Warren J., however, appears to be 
approaching this legality from the other side: the.father did not produce 
sufficient evidence to merit a rejection of the mother's claim. 
With the advent of the Charter, and the stated goal of equality of all 
persons, the failure of judges to take difference into account in custody 
cases will further marginalize already-marginalized groups in society. 141 
There is empirical evidence that lesbian (or gay) parents are more likely 
to raise tolerant children who develop with "a general social 
consciousness and awareness encompassing such issues as sexism, 
racism, nuclear disarmament, and non-violence," without the 
restrictions of the gendered expectations in traditional families. 142 The 
question that must be asked, according to Boyd, is: 
Where one parent is lesbian or gay, which parent is better suited to 
assisting the child(ren) in understanding issues of sexuality (including 
societal bias against lesbians and gay men) in a constructive and 
supportive manner. 143 
The assumption that heterosexual parents are best equipped to parent 
because they confo1m to the traditional norm - or that one lesbian parent 
is better because she conforms to the heterosexual norm - is a fallacy in 
140 In Gore/on v. Goertz, supra note 133, McLachlin J. advocated that there should be an 
evidentiary burden on both parties to show what is in the best interests of the child. This is a 
recent decision however, and effectively, it can be assumed from the judgments of past cases 
that once the father raised the issue, the mother was often left with an additional effective 
burden to justify her abilities as a parent. 
141 See e.g. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. 
BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3. 
142 J. Ainslie & K.M. Feltey, "Definitions and Dynamics of Motherhood and Family in 
Lesbian Communities" ( 1991) 17 Marriage and Family Review 63 at 69-71. 
143 S.B. Boyd, "Lesbian Custody Claims", supra note 117 at 151. 
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the Charter era. It allows heterosexism and homophobia to continue 
unchecked and unchallenged. One judge, in granting custody to the 
mother, compared denying custody on grounds of community 
homophobia to a situation of denying custody on grounds of inter-racial 
marriage, which may also be met with community objection. 144 To deny 
custody on racial grounds was ludicrous to him, in part because of a long 
history of combating racism and racist attitudes in our society. 145 It is 
still to be seen, now that the same protections have been afforded to 
lesbians and gay men, whether heterosexist assumptions will also been 
rejected. 
ill. 15 YEARS OF CHARTER DISCOURSE -
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY? 
During this sh01i period of time, substantial gains have been made 
in the area of equality rights for gay and lesbian individuals, especially 
in the form of spousal benefits for same-sex partners. In the area of child 
custody however, there have been fewer cases from which to draw 
conclusions. There could be many reasons for this change. One 
beneficial reason may be that fewer fathers are contesting custody based 
solely on the mother's sexual orientation; the possibility of greater 
social tolerance of difference may have mitigated the animosity and 
hostility of ex-husbands towards their ex-wives' lesbianism. 146 There 
may also be practical reasons, such as unrepmiing or increased private 
settlement. However, one worrisome possibility is that there has been an 
increased judicial erasure of sexual identity as a result of the difference-
blindness approach of the previous period. The Supreme Court had 
found sexual orientation to be an analogous ground under section 15, 
and by refusing to address the issue at all, judges may be attempting to 
insulate themselves from criticism. 
144 K v. K, supra note 90 at 65. 
145 This comparison is not meant to imply a hierarchy of discrimination, but to interrogate 
whether the judiciary is able to move beyond strict categorical approaches to protection from 
discrimination and evolve past successes so that they apply on a larger scale. 
146 See Parki11so!l v. Neil-Parkinso11, [1998] S.J. No. 371 (Q.B., Fam. Div.); custody was 
agreed by the parties to be joint, which each parent having primary care and control over one 
child. Compare this dynamic with Bezmi·e. supra note 83, and other earlier cases. 
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Of the two reported cases during this period, 147 one case certainly 
reflects little change in the dynamic between the parties, which surfaced 
in cases such as Bezaire, Tomanek and Daller. In Anger v. Anger, 148 the 
father vehemently objected to the mother having custody of the children 
because he found her "lesbianism repugnant and reprehensible on 
religious and moral grounds. He firmly believes that it is harmful to the 
children in some ill-defined way."149 Master Nitikman firmly rejected 
this stance. He overturned a previous court order which forbade Ms. 
Anger from having overnight access or access in the presence of her 
partner. He fmther stated that: 
[the father] is so convinced of the righteousness of his stance vis-a-vis 
the [mother], he is not prepared to accept any evidence that, in fact, 
[she] can be a lesbian and still be a good mother. 
There is nothing in the brief judgment assessing the "discreetness" 
of the mother's relationship and, in fact, the Master expressed his 
disapproval of the fathers views and its effect on the best interests of the 
children. While it is possible that Ms. Anger was still required to lead 
evidence of how she would "shield their children from the unpleasant 
reality of homophobia in society"150 - that is, her lesbianism - Master 
Nitikman did not appear to find this crucial enough include it in the 
decision. He ordered interim joint custody, consisting of four days with 
the mother and three days with the father. He further ordered that the 
parties were not to make disparaging remarks about one another. 151 
This development is certainly an important one. It appears that this 
court is beginning to ask Susan Boyd's important question of assessing 
parents on their ability to raise children in a constructive and supportive 
manner, rather than privileging the party who can best foster an 
ignorance of difference. This presents a substantial challenge to the 
unequivocal privileging of the traditional family paradigm, the 
heterosexualized and essentialized mother figure, and the heterosexist 
assumptions which underlie these ideologies. Fmther, it is possible that 
147 There were only two cases which were directly applicable to this analysis. However, for 
a list of relevant cases which occmTed between lesbian parents, see supra note 111. 
14s [1998] B.C.J. No. 1392 (S.C.). 
149 Ibid. at para. 18. 
150 S.B. Boyd, "Lesbian Custody Claims", supra note 117 at 143. 
151 A11ge1; supra note 148; the trial was scheduled for October 1998, but it is either 
unreported or a private agreement had been made between the parties. 
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this approach constitutes a new trend in custody determinations between 
a heterosexual father and a lesbian mother. 
In Ouelletv. Ouellet, 152 Gordon J. ordered primary care and control 
of the children to the mother, who was in a one-year long relationship 
with another woman. The judge found that the main issue was to balance 
two aspects of each parent's life: 
There is a contrast here on two fronts ... Firstly, the mother seems able 
to converse openly with the children about almost anything, barring 
certain personal and intimate subjects whereas the children apparently 
feel unable to freely converse with the father. The children's 
emotional stability can be assisted in open communications. 
Secondly, the father's relationship seems more stable than that of the 
mother. [He had been remarried for eight years at the time of trial]. 153 
In previous cases, it was almost indisputable that the ability of the 
father to provide a traditional family form would result in the mother 
losing her claim, despite the positive aspects her care could provide. 
However, in this case, a more functional approach to parenting was 
taken, as opposed to falling back into non-questionable familial 
ideology. Gordon J. 's comment, that "society's tolerance or lack thereof 
in the present day concerns many adults and must surely present an 
anxious unknown for a child,'' actually served to assist Ms. Ouellet's 
claim rather than refute it. Her greater willingness to place the children 
in therapy "to enlighten, explain and strengthen the children to meet the 
reflections from and upon the mother's sexual orientation" was seen as 
"necessary" and positive. 154 
Although a significant sign of progress, it may still be too soon to 
celebrate. 155 On the facts of the case, Gordon J. placed much weight on 
152 [1996] O.J. No. 1710 (C.J., Gen. Div.). 
153 ibid. at paras. 12-14. 
154 ibid. at paras. 23 & 25. 
155 But see Re K (1995), 23 0.R. (3d) 679 (Prov. Div.) [hereinafter Re K] where, in 
finding the legal ban-ier to adoption by same-sex couples was unconstitutional, Nevins J. 
provided an in-depth and comprehensive judgment rejecting previous stereotypes of 
homosexnal couples. In the course of his reasons he also rebutted previous assumptions 
about the privileging of the traditional family: 
Recent studies on the effects of the non-traditional family structure on 
the development of children suggests that there is no reason to conclude 
that alteration of the family structure itself is detrimental to child 
development. The prevailing opinion ofresearchers in this area seems to 
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the children's stated preference to live with their mother. He also felt the 
need to outline the mother's relationship history when assessing the 
"instability" of her relationship. It is difficult, from the scarcity of cases, 
to fully analyze whether the courts have begun taking a more 
substantive-equality approach to custody cases involving lesbian 
mothers - whether they are recognizing that difference does not always 
equate with deviance. 
4. Summary 
The purpose of the foregoing survey was not to propose that 
mothers should always get custody, or that iflesbian mothers do not then 
this is de.facto discrimination. Rather, I hoped to problematize oblivious 
deference to the dominant and dominating ideologies of familialism, 
motherhood, and heteronormativity and the effects it has in refusing to 
listen to alternative discourses. What then, is a proper approach to take 
in custody disputes? What determines a good parent? When and how 
should difference be recognized? These are questions I will attempt to 
address in the next section. 
SEQUEL? 
I am ce1iainly not the first to address the oppressive effects of 
dominant ideologies on lesbian and gay individuals and relationships. 
The legal failures and successes surrounding the gay and lesbian 
equality rights movement has led to what Brenda Cassman describes as 
the "We are Family" "We Are Not Family" debate. Whereas the 
former seeks inclusion within the legal and social definition of the 
Family, the latter seeks to destroy the assimilationist and coercive force 
of the Family definition. 156 In short, it is an offshoot of the sameness/ 
difference debate which predominated feminist circles for so long 
be that the traditional family structure is no longer considered as, the only 
framework within which adequate child care can be given. 
He further emphasized that there are a "multiplicity of pathways" along which child care 
can take place. However, the thrust of Nevins J.'s reasons was to classify the relationships of 
the lesbian applicants as the same as heterosexual relationships. 
156 B. Cossman, "Family Inside/Out" ( 1994) 44 University of Toronto L.J. 1 [herinafter 
"Inside/Out"]. 
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during and after second wave feminism. This debate is valuable to the 
custody context because of the pervasive role of family ideology imbued 
within it. Further it is helpful in grounding possible recommendations 
within the framework of those that will be affected by changes in 
custody law. 
There are positive and negative aspects of both arguments. 
Whereas the sameness approach has resulted in increased recognition, 
greater benefits and greater tolerance of gay and lesbian relationships, it 
is certainly susceptible to the critiques of the We Are Not Family 
faction. By employing strict rights-based, formal equality discourse, and 
"by appropriating familial ideology, lesbians and gay men may be 
supporting the very institutional structures that create and perpetuate 
women's oppression."157 Further, the formal equality approach erected 
many barriers to lesbians involved in custody disputes in the pre- and 
early- Charter periods, illustrated above. "By claiming our rights as 
spouses, rather than our rights/needs as people, we emulate and 
legitimize the ideological norm and we also compound the 
marginalization of others." 158 However, this is not to say the Difference 
side of the debate is without its flaws. 
Ruthann Robson sees the Family exclusively as a site of 
assimilation, domestication, coercion, arrogation, and indoctrination for 
lesbian women. 159 She advocates rejecting the category and construction 
of the Family completely, to unname it as it would apply to lesbian 
relationships and "to reconceptualize ourselves and our relationships in 
as yet unimaginable ways ... Within lesbian legal theorizing, this means 
theorizing not as if lesbian relations are commensurate to familial 
relations but as if lesbian relations are commensurate only to 
themselves." 160 
In contrast, Didi Herman calls attention to some difficulties with 
Robson's "lesbian standpointism". 161 She cautions against the 
157 D. Herman, "Are we Family?: Lesbian Rights and Women's Liberation" (1990) 28 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 789 at 797. See also D. Herman. Righ!.s ofPassage: S1mgglesfer Lesbian 
& Gay Legal (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) at 54-76. 
158 /bid. at 799. 
159 R. Robson, "Resisting the Family: Repositioning Lesbians in Legal Theory" [1994] 
Signs 975. 
160 Ibid at 992-93. 
161 D. Herman, "A Jurisprndence of One's Own? Ruthann Robson's Lesbian Legal Theory" 
(1994) 7 Can. J. Women & the Law 509 at 514 [hereinafter "Jurisprudence"]. 
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exclusionary effects of privileging a single, lesbian experience as theory 
and overemphasizing difference: 
Rather than challenging [the construction of lesbians and gay men as 
"minorities"], the development of 'lesbian jurisprudence' may 
reinforce it. First, by insisting on the separation of lesbianism from 
feminism, second, by positing a homogeneous 'lesbian consciousness/ 
theory', and third, by rejecting an ethic of solidarity with gay men and 
heterosexual women ... Rather than exploring the historically 
contingent production of gender categories and the accompanying 
regulation of sexuality, one would think that Robson views lesbians as 
a kind of 'third sex', somehow creating our own world outside of 
dominant social relations. 162 
Thus, a lesbian-centred, anti-Family, jurisprudence faces the 
dangers of: reinforcing the current social and legal pecking order; 
creating a new hierarchy between "real" or "natural" lesbians and others 
that do not subscribe to the theory; 163 and politically shooting itself in the 
foot by (re )positioning itself entirely outside of social and legal 
discourses. Lastly, as with most epistemological claims, lesbian 
jurisprudence theory appears to accept its position as a homogenous 
"other" despite diversity within the lesbian community and fails to 
problematize the source of the dualism: heterosexuality which posits 
itself as an ideology. 164 
The main problem with both sides of the debate is that each 
constructs itself and its position as "right" and "true". However, the 
presence of such a heated debate is itself cogent evidence that neither is, 
nor can be, the "right" answer; this struggle is complicated, 
contradictory and confusing, but necessarily so. Brenda Cossman 
recommends rejecting the dichotomous nature of the debate: 
162 Ibid. at 521. 
163 For a discussion of the "real lesbian hierarchy" which is present in some lesbian 
communities, see D. Day, "Lesbian/Mother" in S.D. Stone, ed., Lesbia11s i11 Ca11ada (Toronto: 
Between the Lines, 1990) at 36 where she explains: 
"Real lesbians don't have children. This is proclaimed with equal loudness 
by both straight women (and men) and 'real' lesbians. Real lesbians have 
never been fucked. Real lesbians have never had spenn inside their bodies. 
The thought of sperm makes them sick. Real lesbians are not interested in 
children especially male children. Real lesbians find children boring and 
tedious. Real lesbians have much more important work to do." 
164 D. Heiman, "Jurisprudence'', szr,vra note 161 at 521. See also B. Cossman, "Inside/Out", 
szr,v1Yl note 156. 
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The family/not family dilemma begins to dissolve when we refuse to 
accept the dilemma on its own terms, when we reject its either/or, and 
recognize that we are both. Exploring the contradictory nature of 
subjectivity can help us begin to reveal the ways in which we live at 
multiple and conflicting sites of family, and the ways in which the 
increasing dichotomization of the debate obscures and negates the 
complexities of our lives. But contradiction is much more difficult for 
legal politics. Legal categories do not allow for contradiction. 165 
There is no "universal family" but there is a dominant discourse of 
Family. The We are Family - We are Not Family debate accepts the 
legal concept of "family" and runs with it, rather than questioning that 
concept and definition and trying to problematize it in the first instance. 
The question that needs to be addressed is how to make room for 
alternative familial discourses in custody law, in order to both challenge 
the privileged position of one ideology, and also to prevent the further 
marginalization of others. 166 While law is by far not the only site of 
domination and resistance, it is an important one. The question to ask 
now is how the law, and judges implementing the law, can adequately 
accommodate heretofore silenced experiences and discourses in the 
context of custody law. 
1. The Question of Family 
One's conceptual and emotional definitions of family can be quite 
different, and often contradictory. 167 However, from the judicial chair, it 
is most likely that only the conceptual traditional family is invoked 
when dealing in "Family Law" and the wide discretion of the "best 
interests of the child" test. Further, given the social position and 
165 B. Cossman, "Inside/Out", st1pra note 156 at 30. See also B. Cossman, "Same-Sex 
Couples and the Politics of Family Status" in J. Brodie, ed., Wome11 a11d Calladiall Public 
Policy (Toronto: Barcourt Brace, 1996) at 223. 
166 As C. Smati writes in the context of marriage: 
"A primary goal must be to jettison the privileged status of the 
heterosexual married couple, but not in order to create a different 
hierarchy of 'unmarried' households." 
C. Smart, The Ties that Bind: Law, 1Warriage and the reprodt1ctio11 (}/patriarchal relations 
(London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1984) at 146. 
167 For example, having been socialized in the dominant discourse of familialism, I 
instinctively conceptualize "family" as: parents + children. However, in my personal life, I 
consider a variety of relationships to be "familial" and none of these conform to the previous 
definition. 
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backgrounds of most judges, it is likely their personal experiences 
conform to this definition. 168 I do not propose anything so drastic as to 
abolish the family as a legal term - this would be impractical and 
impracticable at this time given the history of its importance as a social 
and legal term of reference. What I do propose to do is to highlight the 
difficulties of the present conception and discuss how it can be broken 
down so that it functions not only to tolerate, but also to substantively 
recognize the value of other family forms and conceptions of 
motherhood. There are certainly no "easy answers", no legal checklist, 
nor any magic antidote; however, recognizing the problem is 
undoubtedly a precondition to solving it. 
According to some empirical studies, there are certain qualitative 
differences between lesbian and other relationships. 
Serial monogamy is the dominant pattern ... , lesbians are more often 
involved in co-parenting than gay men, and may be more likely to 
resist gender roles ... , [lesbian] relationships tend to be more 
egalitarian than heterosexual relationships in terms of finances, 
decision-making, and domestic labour. 169 
These differences, when filtered through a heterosexist or homophobic 
lens, may be interpreted as "non-familial" in the custody context. 170 We 
must decide what we want "families" to do as part of society, what 
functions they should fulfill, and how this can occur in tandem with the 
positive recognition of difference, without the marginalization of other 
family forms through prejudices, stereotypes and biases. 
First, rather than confining one's self to a closed rubric of"family", 
consisting of isolated component parts, a functional and relational 
definition would be more helpful in deciding what is actually in the best 
interests of the child. Some structure or unit is needed in the context of 
child custody, which would be, at a minimum, two people a "parent" 
and a "child"; but it is the relationship between the "members" that 
should be the focus of assessment. According to psychological research, 
"the most impo1iant element in the healthy development [of a child] is a 
168 See R.F. Devlin et al, "Reducing the Democratic Deficit" (forthcoming, 2000). 
169 S.B. Boyd, "Expanding the Family", supra note 116, at 559. See also F. Nelson, Lesbian 
1vfotherhood: An E1plomtio11 of Cmwdlcm Lesbian Families (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1996). 
170 The debate around "Family" is somewhat more complex in the "spousal recognition" 
context which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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stable, consistent, warm, and responsive relationship between [that] 
child and his or her care-giver" 171 : 
Obviously, the enumeration of relationship characteristics, in and 
of themselves, is insufficient to foster meaningful participation and 
substantively equal treatment of lesbian mothers in custody cases. 
Ce1iainly, many judges would whole-heartedly agree with factors such 
as caring, responsiveness, and love between parent and child. What is 
additionally required is that judicial officers question their familial, 
paternalistic, and heterosexist biases which arise in the application of 
these principles. 
Secondly, "substantively equal treatment" should not mean the 
erasure of sexual or gender identity. This only encourages strict 
adherence to a heterosexual and dominant norm without questioning the 
assumptions that underlie it. If a "lesbian lifestyle" tends to increase 
tolerance in children or other valuable attributes - and there is evidence 
this is so 172 - then this should be recognized, affirmed, and supported. 
Further, so long as the sexual division of labour continues to push 
women into the private sphere and assign them the role of care-giver, 
their contribution to the parent-child relationship should be recognized 
and commended, rather than erased as paii of a formal equality approach 
between the sexes. 
Thirdly, and in relation to the second point, decision makers should 
make a concerted effort to appreciate and value difference between 
parties. The recent trend of using an extremely fact-based and 
individualized analysis is a positive sign, 173 however, if the arbiter has 
his/her own pre-conceived conception of what environment is "best", no 
amount of evidence would refute this standpoint. Different experiences 
and perspectives must be listened to and accepted with an open mind not 
a closed fist. If lesbian mothers are forced to closet themselves out of 
fear of persecution, then the principles of libe1iy, fairness, and equal 
dignity and respect are rendered meaningless. 
Fourthly, the privatization of the Family has created numerous 
burdens for lesbian mothers and women generally. Courts and 
legislatures have simultaneously recognized children as a "public" issue 
171 Cited in Re K, supm note 155. 
172 Supra note 142. 
173 See Gordon v. Goe11z, supra note 133. 
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- necessary for the good of society - and yet relegated all responsibility 
into "private" domain. The lack of adequate public resources or social 
support, combined with the social stigma and pressure on mothers, 
creates a significant barrier that must be removed for true equality. 174 
Similarly, the heterosexism of society should not act as a penalty to 
lesbian mothers and force them to bear the burden of discrimination. 
Liberal fictions of sameness between peoples and persons belie the 
reality of significant disparities in power and social position. This is 
where the idea of accommodation as developed in human rights 
jurisprudence should have a role in redressing these imbalances, rather 
than penalizing women or lesbian women for the discrimination of 
society. 
Lastly, it must be recognized and admitted that the dominant nonn 
of the traditional family is a misnomer. While still normatively 
dominant, it is no longer, and for some never was, an accurate reflection 
of reality. Stereotypes of the traditional family, the assignment of 
gendered roles within it, and the naturalization of familial 
heterosexuality175 should be jettisoned. Law should reflect social reality 
and promote social equality, not serve to support and perpetuate out-
dated and oppressive ideologies. 
v. CONCLUSION - DENOUEMENT OR CLIMAX? 
In this paper I have attempted to show how law and legal discourse 
supports the ideological claims of Familialism, Motherhood, and 
Heteronormativity in the context of child custody cases involving 
lesbian mothers. The development of judicial interpretation of 
lesbianism from an assumption of it as a negative factor, or a 
presumption that it is negative unless rebutted by showing one fits 
within the traditional rubric, to a strictly neutral analysis, and, finally, to 
a modest recognition of difference has done little to challenge 
174 S.B. Boyd, "(Re)Placing the State", supra note 29. 
175 Considering the great weight most judges put on factual evidence, an interesting statistic 
available for use is that one-third of lesbians are parents. M.A. McCarthy and J. L. Radbord, 
"Family Law for Same Sex Couples: Chart(er)ing the Course" (1998) 15 Can. J. Fam. L. 101 
at 124. 
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underlying ideological premises and constructs. It is undeniable that 
substantial improvements have been made in how judges assess the 
"best interests of the child" in this context, but this does not mean that 
the battles are over. 
One disturbing trend is the increasing invisibility and avoidance of 
a mother's sexual identity. While this could be positive in that judges 
may not have found it necessary to the determination of the case - that 
is, it was not used in a negative way- it is also troublesome in that there 
is no way of knowing how it was incorporated into their decision. The 
effects of insidious prejudice or bias are just as harmful as overt 
discrimination. 
This paper has attempted to address this problem on three levels: 
the theoretical, the empirical and the legal. However, given the goals and 
objectives outlined, legal and judicial reform is only one battlefield; 
other terrains of struggle must also be crossed. Law, while a dominant 
and dominating discourse, also acts in tandem with other sites of 
oppression and resistance. Many past gains have been garnered 
politically, 176 socially, 177 and scientifically, 178 and dominant ideologies 
must continue to be destabilized and interrogated on these levels. How 
the story will end is uncertain, but it is imperative that the curtain does 
not close until after all of the players have taken a bow. 
176 For example, although Ontario Bill 5, supra note 3 I, may appear a staggering 
improvement on its face, the governmental rhetoric surrounding it continues to be adverse, and 
even hostile to its purpose. The government rationale is that its hands are tied and they are 
being "forced" to pass the bill to prevent the costs and time consumption of lengthy litigation. 
177 Some public opinion polls appear to be supportive of familial recognition of same-sex 
couples. See A. Mcilroy, "Most in poll want gay marriages legalized" The Globe and Mail (10 
June 1999), online: EGALE Canada <http://www.egale.ca/-egale/archives/press/ 
9906 !0poll.htm> (date accessed: 29 November 1999); for other poll results see "Poll Results 
on Same-Sex Benefits", online: EGALE Canada <http://www.egale.ca/features/polls2.htm> 
(date accessed: 29 November 1999). While mostly supportive, it is uncertain, given the twin 
paternalistic discourse of"Child Protection" what public opinion would be on child custody or 
adoption. 
178 The pathological stereotypes of the past, as illustrated in Mo11ette, supra note 96, shows 
the way even "science" is susceptible to fallacious stereotypes and assumptions. These have 
since been largely refuted through the increased participation of female and lesbian 
researchers in the field. See e.g. S. Reinharz, Femi11isr Methods ti1 Social Research (New 
York: Oxford University Press, I 992). 
